Exploit matérialisé
CVE-2019-5788
HIGH1 exploit(s) public(s) pour cette CVE, 1 matérialisé(s) avec leur code.
À des fins de recherche défensive uniquement. Ne testez que sur des systèmes que vous possédez ou pour lesquels vous détenez une autorisation écrite. L'accès non autorisé est illégal.
ExploitDB
dos multiple Vérifié
Source
Google Chrome < M73 - FileSystemOperationRunner Use-After-Free
Par Google Security Research
Comment tester cet exploit
Déni de service : envoie une entrée malformée pour crasher le service. À tester en VM isolée, l'effet est destructif.
Code txt
There's a comment in FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation
OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation(
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation) {
OperationID id = next_operation_id_++;
// TODO(https://crbug.com/864351): Diagnostic to determine whether OperationID
// wrap-around is occurring in the wild.
DCHECK(operations_.find(id) == operations_.end());
// ! If id already in operations_, this will free operation
operations_.emplace(id, std::move(operation));
return id;
}
The id is an int, and it can wrap, and if it does this will cause a use-after-free in the browser process, since the normal usage of BeginOperation is the following:
OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::Truncate(const FileSystemURL& url,
int64_t length,
StatusCallback callback) {
base::File::Error error = base::File::FILE_OK;
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation = base::WrapUnique(
file_system_context_->CreateFileSystemOperation(url, &error));
// ! take a raw pointer to the contents of the unique_ptr
FileSystemOperation* operation_raw = operation.get();
// ! call BeginOperation passing the move'd unique_ptr, freeing operation
OperationID id = BeginOperation(std::move(operation));
base::AutoReset<bool> beginning(&is_beginning_operation_, true);
if (!operation_raw) {
DidFinish(id, std::move(callback), error);
return id;
}
PrepareForWrite(id, url);
// ! use the raw free'd pointer here.
operation_raw->Truncate(url, length,
base::BindOnce(&FileSystemOperationRunner::DidFinish,
weak_ptr_, id, std::move(callback)));
return id;
}
I think that to trigger this, you'd need either a malformed blob in the blob registry, or access to the FileWriter api, so at present this would require a compromised renderer.
I've attached two PoCs that should trigger this issue; it looks like the runtime for either approach from javascript should take ~2 days on my machine. (I'd suggest patching the OperationId typedef to short to reproduce, unless you are extremely patient).
$ python ./copy_mojo_js_bindings.py /path/to/chrome/.../out/Asan/gen
$ python -m SimpleHTTPServer&
$ /ssd/chrome_trunk/src/out/Asan/chrome --enable-blink-features=MojoJS --user-data-dir=/tmp/aa 'http://localhost:8000/id_overflow_no_filewriter.html'
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/46571.zip