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Exploit matérialisé

CVE-2019-5788

HIGH

1 exploit(s) public(s) pour cette CVE, 1 matérialisé(s) avec leur code.

À des fins de recherche défensive uniquement. Ne testez que sur des systèmes que vous possédez ou pour lesquels vous détenez une autorisation écrite. L'accès non autorisé est illégal.
ExploitDB dos multiple Vérifié
Source

Google Chrome < M73 - FileSystemOperationRunner Use-After-Free

Par Google Security Research

Comment tester cet exploit

Déni de service : envoie une entrée malformée pour crasher le service. À tester en VM isolée, l'effet est destructif.

Code txt

There's a comment in FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation

OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation(
    std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation) {
  OperationID id = next_operation_id_++;

  // TODO(https://crbug.com/864351): Diagnostic to determine whether OperationID
  // wrap-around is occurring in the wild.
  DCHECK(operations_.find(id) == operations_.end());

  // ! If id already in operations_, this will free operation
  operations_.emplace(id, std::move(operation));
  return id;
}

The id is an int, and it can wrap, and if it does this will cause a use-after-free in the browser process, since the normal usage of BeginOperation is the following:

OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::Truncate(const FileSystemURL& url,
                                                int64_t length,
                                                StatusCallback callback) {
  base::File::Error error = base::File::FILE_OK;
  std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation = base::WrapUnique(
      file_system_context_->CreateFileSystemOperation(url, &error));
  // ! take a raw pointer to the contents of the unique_ptr
  FileSystemOperation* operation_raw = operation.get();
  // ! call BeginOperation passing the move'd unique_ptr, freeing operation
  OperationID id = BeginOperation(std::move(operation));
  base::AutoReset<bool> beginning(&is_beginning_operation_, true);
  if (!operation_raw) {
    DidFinish(id, std::move(callback), error);
    return id;
  }
  PrepareForWrite(id, url);
  // ! use the raw free'd pointer here.
  operation_raw->Truncate(url, length,
                          base::BindOnce(&FileSystemOperationRunner::DidFinish,
                                         weak_ptr_, id, std::move(callback)));
  return id;
}

I think that to trigger this, you'd need either a malformed blob in the blob registry, or access to the FileWriter api, so at present this would require a compromised renderer.

I've attached two PoCs that should trigger this issue; it looks like the runtime for either approach from javascript should take ~2 days on my machine. (I'd suggest patching the OperationId typedef to short to reproduce, unless you are extremely patient).

$ python ./copy_mojo_js_bindings.py /path/to/chrome/.../out/Asan/gen
$ python -m SimpleHTTPServer&
$ /ssd/chrome_trunk/src/out/Asan/chrome --enable-blink-features=MojoJS --user-data-dir=/tmp/aa 'http://localhost:8000/id_overflow_no_filewriter.html'


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/46571.zip